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Chapter I 
CYBER OPERATIONS AS A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUE: 
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS AND APPLICABLE LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of modern technology is inevitably bound to change the conduct of warfare.1 It 
is also self-evident that the mode, typology and participants in current armed conflicts do not fit 
within the structures of traditional international law on the use of armed force.2 Indeed, in some 
cases the new conflicts pose intractable challenges to the existing law.3 This is particularly true 
with regard to the military use of cyber operations either in the context of armed self-defence or 
in the conduct of hostilities in time of armed conflict.4 The establishment of the worldwide 
computer network and the increasing reliance on digital services has brought about a new type of 
clear and present danger: the threat of cyber attack.5     
The fact that cyber operations are a relatively novel phenomenon in the history of 
international law automatically raises some important questions regarding whether the existing 
rules of international law apply to them.6 Consider the evidence indicating that there have been 
Chinese government-backed cyber operations, including espionage, targeting State and corporate 
computer networks in the United States.7  
The question that arises in regard to cyber incidents, like the one illustrated above, is whether 
international law governs them, and if so which specific rules apply, and the circumstances in 
which they apply. With the aim of clarifying the uncertainty as to the specific rules pertinent to 
cyber warfare, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare was 
                                                          
1 D Fleck, ‘Introduction’ in D Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2013). 
2 T Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (2005); Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and 
Self-Defence (2012); N Cox, Technology and Legal Systems (2006). 
3 R Arnold & PA Hildebrand, International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century’s Conflicts: Changes and 
Challenges (2005). 
4 M Roscini, Cyber Operations and the International Law on the Use of Force (2013). 
5  F Schreier, On Cyber Warfare (2014) DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper No. 7, 7: “Since information 
technology and the internet have developed to such an extent that they have become a major element of national 
power, cyberwar has become the drumbeat of the day as nation-states are arming themselves for the cyber 
battlespace.” 
6 HH Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (2012). 
7 E Nakashima & W Wan, ‘China’s Denials about Cyber Attacks Undermined by Video Clip’ Washington Post, 24 
August 2011. 
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developed by a group of twenty renowned international law scholars and practitioners.8 It 
provides a useful basis on which to identify how and evaluate the extent to which international 
law applies to cyber operations.9  
This research seeks to critically appraise both the current and prospective contribution of the 
Tallinn Manual to the advancement of international law. In particular, it focuses on how 
international law as enunciated in the Tallinn Manual governs cyber operations in general and 
how it applies to cyber-unique aspects of this form of warfare.  
The research then reviews the achievements of the Tallinn Manual as well as its shortfalls in 
relation to the development of a coherent framework of international law that can be used to 
govern cyber operations. After this, the research turns to the increasing role of non-binding 
instruments of international law in the process of international law-making. The case is then 
made for the possibility of the Tallinn Manual being the basis on which future binding norms 
may be crafted to provide specific legal regulation for cyber operations. 
2. EMERGENCE OF CYBER OPERATIONS AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUE 
2.1 Initial Academic Concern 
The questions surrounding the use of cyber operations and their legal implications began to 
emerge in the later part of the 1990s.10 In 1999 the United States Naval War College organized a 
legal conference where legal experts presented papers on various aspects of cyber operations.11 
The proceedings of this conference were subsequently compiled in an edited volume, which has 
since become an important reference in research on cyber operations.12  
However, in the years following the 1999 conference at the US Naval War College, cyber 
warfare and, in particular, its international legal implications received little attention. This was 
primarily because of subsequent political and international developments, particularly the so-
called “war on terror”.13 This attitude would later change in the wake of some cyber incidents, 
which made clear the fact that the once theoretical and hypothetical spectre of massive cyber 
                                                          
8 MN Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013).  
9 Roscini (n 4) 30. 
10 M Ignatief, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (2000). 
11 BT O’Donnell & JC Kraska, ‘Humanitarian Law: Developing International Rules for the Digital Battlefield’ 
(2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 133. 
12 MN Schmitt & BT O’Donnell (ed), Computer Network Attack and International Law (2002).   
13 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 1. 
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operations causing injury, death or destruction, whether directly or indirectly, was increasingly 
becoming a reality.  
2.2 Cyber Incidents and the Awakening of International Legal Concern 
2.2.1 Cyber Operations against Estonia 
Cyber operations returned to the forefront of international concern in 2007 after the massive 
computer network attack against Estonia, and particularly the disruption and disabling of 
government information systems and commercial internet infrastructure.14 The cyber attacks 
arose when disgruntled ethnic Russians objected to the Estonian government’s decision to 
relocate a Soviet World War II monument (the statue of the bronze soldier) previously situated in 
the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery outside the city.15  
The objection of the ethnic Russians towards the relocation of the statue resulted in the cyber 
attacks against Estonia. These consisted of organized and coordinated denial of service and 
distributed denial of service attacks against critical government websites such as the presidential 
and ministerial website as well as the parliamentary website.16 The attacks also targeted 
commercial interests such as banking information systems and newspapers.17  
The cyber attacks against Estonia, which began on 27 April 2007, continued over a period of 
several weeks.18 They had the general effect of disrupting essential government services and 
communication systems which had an adverse impact on the country’s economy.19 Moreover, the 
attacks were attended by “widespread social unrest and rioting, which left 150 people injured and 
one Russian national dead.”20  
It has never been conclusively determined which State or non-State entity was responsible 
for the cyber operations against Estonia, but the finger of suspicion has been pointed at Russian 
                                                          
14 MN Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited’ (2011) 56 Villanova Law Review 569. 
15 Ibid. 
16 E Tikk, K Kaska & L Vihul, International Cyber Incidents – Legal Considerations (2010) 15. 
17 Ibid.  
18 S Brenner, ‘At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare’ (2007) 97 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 379, 384-86; M Landler & J Markoff, ‘Digital Fears Emerge after Data Siege in 
Estonia’ New York Times, 29 May 2007, at A1. 
19 N Falliere, LO Murchu & E Chien, 'W32.Stuxnet Dossier', Symantec Security Response Whitepaper, Version 1.4, 
11 February 2011. 
20 SJ Shackleford, ‘From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law’ (2009) 27(1) 
Berkley Journal of International Law 192, 194. 
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authorities.21 Specific allegations have been made that the Russian government instructed a 
Russian cyber crime firm22 to instigate the attacks against Estonia. For its part, the Russian 
government has denied any involvement in the attacks. This illustrates the difficulty in 
attributing legal responsibility for cyber operations under international law.  
2.2.2 Cyber Operations against Georgia 
There have been other cyber incidents involving hostile cyber operations against States and 
corporate entities after the Estonian attacks. A notable example is the cyber operation mounted 
against Georgia during its armed conflict with the Russian Federation in 2008.23 On 7 August 
2007, Georgian forces mounted an attack against separatist forces acting within its territory. As a 
result, Russia launched a military offensive by launching operations in Georgian territory. The 
physical presence of Russian forces in Georgia was preceded and subsequently accompanied by 
hostile cyber operations against a large number of Georgian governmental websites, making it 
among the first cases in which an international political and military conflict was accompanied 
by a coordinated cyber offensive.24   
2.2.3 Cyber Operations against Iran 
Another notable cyber incident is the reported use in 2010 of the Stuxnet worm to disable Iranian 
nuclear coolers that were critical to the weaponization programme.25 The factual background of 
this incident highlights how difficult it can be to accurately characterize a cyber operation, and 
consequently to determine the applicable international law. In particular, the Stuxnet incident 
gave rise to serious legal and practical challenges that prevented its definitive classification as an 
international armed conflict or an armed attack triggering the right to self-defence. 
In June 2010, malicious software was identified in affected computers by independent 
information technology researchers who noted its “unique functions” and “level of 
sophistication”.26 The computer virus, later named Stuxnet, had a specific attack vector and only 
                                                          
21 C Lotrionte, ‘Active Defense for Cyber: A Legal Framework for Covert Countermeasures’ in J Carr (ed), Inside 
Cyber Warfare (2012) 282; Klimburg, ‘Mobilising Cyber Power’ 49-50; I Traynor, ‘Russia Accused of Unleashing 
Cyber War to Disable Estonia’, The Guardian, 17 May 2007:  
available at www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia. 
22 Roscini (n 4) 36. 
23 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 2. 
24 Tikk et al (n 16) 4. 
25 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 2. 
26 J Richardson, Stuxnet as Cyber Warfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield (2011) 6. 
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targeted certain types of computers, and exhibited a high affinity for computers in Iran. It later 
emerged that Stuxnet was designed to disrupt and shut down the uranium enrichment facility in 
the city of Nantaz. After successfully infiltrating the Iranian nuclear facility’s network, Stuxnet 
caused the centrifuge rotor components to spin at irregular speeds thereby causing vibrations that 
would destroy the centrifuges. While Stuxnet significantly disrupted the nuclear enrichment 
project, it did not destroy the centrifuges completely.27 The origin of Stuxnet and the actors 
behind it remain a matter of speculation, but there are numerous reports indicating the complicity 
of American and Israeli State authorities.28   
2.3 Cyber Attack as a Threat to National and Regional Security 
The cumulative effect of these cyber incidents has brought home the reality that cyber operations 
pose a critical threat to the national security of States and to the well-being of human life and 
commercial interests.29 Accordingly, States began to appreciate the importance of formulating 
guidelines to tackle the new threat of cyber war. Indeed, some States have already adopted 
cyber-specific national security policy and strategy documents.  
The government of the United States, for example, has explicitly stated in its 2010 National 
Security Strategy that cyber threats constitute “one of the most serious national security, public 
safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation.”30 For its part, the government of the 
United Kingdom in its 2010 National Security Strategy cited “cyber attack, including by other 
States, and by organised crime and terrorists” as one of the top threats to British national 
security.31 Other States, including Russia32 and Canada,33 have adopted strategy documents 
specifically dealing with the protection of their respective national security from the threat of 
cyber attack. 
Regional organizations established under multilateral agreements have recognized the 
significance of the threat posed by cyber attack. An example is the approach of NATO in its 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
28 DE Sanger, ‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyber Attacks against Iran’, The New York Times, 1 June 2012 ; 
WJ Broad et al, ‘Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay’, The New York Times, 15 January 
2011. 
29 P Berkowitz (ed), Future Challenges in National Security and Law (2011). 
30 The White House, National Security Strategy (2010) 27. 
31 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (2010) 11. 
32 Russian Federation, Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 
Information Space (2011). 
33 Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy (2010). 
6 
 
2010 Strategic Concept34 which provides suitable illustration for the contemporary relevance of 
the threat of cyber attack and the need to: 
‘develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, 
including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence 
capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating 
NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations’.35 
These developments demonstrate the fact that cyber operations have come of age as an important 
part of international relations that urgently needs to be regulated by international law. 
2.4 Enter the Tallinn Manual 
The cyber attacks against Estonia, a member of NATO, led to the establishment of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Tallinn (the capital of 
Estonia) and the Cyber Defence Management Agency (CDMA). In recognition of the need to 
clarify the international law applicable to cyber operations, the CCDCOE set up a group of 
experts from its member States and it was tasked with drafting the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. This Manual was intended to clarify how and 
the extent to which international law governed cyber operations. The upshot of this process was 
the identification of 95 rules of international law, some of which will be discussed in detail in 
later chapters.    
3. FORMULATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
The use in international relations of cyber force whether in the context of self-defence or armed 
conflict is governed by customary international law. This statement has its basis in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion where the International Court of Justice stated that existing 
international law applies “to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.”36 While this 
view is not unanimously accepted, it is a rule of reason that the absence of a specific rule does 
not diminish the obligation to act in accordance with the applicable law, however general it 
might be. Hence, in the specific case of the conduct of cyber operations, there is a general 
obligation to comply with the current international law. 
                                                          
34 NATO, Active Defence, Modern Engagement: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010). 
35 Ibid at 16-17. 
36 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Reports 226, para 39. 
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Yet, it is important to note that cyber operations are an entirely new and unique phenomenon 
that the provisions of classical international law could not possibly have contemplated. One of 
the main challenges concerns the manner and extent to which international law applies to cyber 
operations.37 The fact that cyber operations are an emergent and evolving form of engagement 
means that it is conceivable that cyber practice may quickly outpace the current international 
law. Thus, it becomes important to analyze the contribution of the Tallinn Manual to the 
advancement of international law. 
The legal problem which the proposed research will tackle is two-fold: the critical question 
of how and if so the extent to which the Tallinn Manual has contributed to the clarification of 
international law pertinent to cyber operations; and the forward-looking question of the possible 
future role of the Tallinn Manual in the development of binding norms of international law 
governing cyber operations. 
4. INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTINENT TO CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE 
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING 
4.1 Applicability of Existing International Law 
The emergence of cyber operations as a practical aspect of contemporary warfare raised a critical 
legal question: how does current international law govern cyber war? It can be argued that 
current international law applies to cyber operations, but it is important to take note of certain 
cyber unique circumstances which will require necessary modification. This corresponds with 
the gap-filling character of the Martens Clause which suggests that the absence of specific rules 
does not preclude the application of certain general rules of international law that are based on 
the principle of humanity. In its most recent enunciation, the Martens Clause provides that: 
in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants 
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.38 
                                                          
37 R Garnett & P Clarke, ‘Cyberterrorism: A New Challenge for International Law’ in A Bianchi (ed), Enforcing 
International Law Norms Against Terrorism (2004) 479. 
38 Article 1(2) AP I. The Martens Clause was introduced into the preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II – Laws 
and Customs of War on Land. The clause took its name from a declaration read by Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens 
also known as Friedrich Martens, the Russian delegate at the Hague Peace Conferences 1899, and was based upon 
his words. 
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The above provision makes clear that customary international law and other mandatory 
principles of international law should apply even in cases for which there are no specific rules. 
This supports the case for the continued application of international law even to new and 
emerging concepts that are not expressly set forth in treaties.39 The following sections explain 
the basis of the applicable international law and highlight the legal issues that arise from the 
extension of certain norms to the new context of cyberspace. 
4.2 Jus ad Bellum 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter supplies the treaty-law basis for the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State. This 
prohibition also finds a basis in the customary principle of sovereign equality of States, which 
prohibits the interference by one State in the internal affairs of other States.40 Certain unique 
aspects of cyber force require a re-examination of the law on the use of force, and these will be 
highlighted below.  
i) Qualification of Cyber Force: Article 2(4) of the UN Charter places an obligation on all 
Members of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the “threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” In light of this, the legal problem 
arises with regard to whether cyber operations qualify as “force” within meaning of Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter.41 The qualification of force typically entails conduct resulting in death, injury 
and destruction, or the threat of such conduct.42 However, in the specific case of cyber operations 
it is unclear whether non-violent cyber operations qualify as a use of force. 
ii) Non-State Entities and Prohibition of Force: The wording of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
prohibits the resort by States to force in the specific context of their international relations.43 This 
appears to indicate that a use of force is only subject to the prohibition in Article 2(4) if the 
                                                          
39 MM Whiteman, Digest of International Law (1963) vol 1, 1.  
40 Nicaragua judgment, para 202; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) 1949 ICJ Reports 4, at 57, 108 and 
152; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 25/2625, UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (24 October 
1970).  
41 MN Schmitt, ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative 
Framework’ (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 929. 
42 A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002) 121.   
43 This provision makes reference to “members of the United Nations” which implies States, and this is supported by 
Article 4 UN Charter which expressly states that only States can be members of the United Nations. 
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conduct at issue is performed by authorized State agents or non-State entities whose conduct can 
be attributed to a State.44 A legal problem may arise in the case of cyber operations where there 
is an insufficient link between the wrongful conduct and the non-State entities involved.45 The 
question that arises in the particular case of individual “lone-wolf” hackers is whether their cyber 
operations are prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.46 
iii) Distinction between “Force” and “Armed Attack”: Article 51 of the UN Charter enunciates 
an exception to or justifiable derogation from the prohibition on the use of force in international 
relations;47 it states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations”. Although Article 51 of the UN Charter provides a justifiable derogation from the 
prohibition of the use of force, it indicates there is a discrepancy in the thresholds of “force” 
within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and “armed attack” within the meaning of 
Article 51 of UN Charter.48 The importance of establishing this distinction is relevant in respect 
of cyber operations because it determines the point at which a cyber incident escalates in scale 
and effect from a “threat or use of force” to an “armed attack”, and the legal consequences that 
follow.49  
However, there is little guidance as to the distinction between “force” and “armed attack” in 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice50 which, in the Nicaragua case, only went 
as far as finding it necessary to distinguish between the most grave forms of the use of force 
amounting to an armed attack from other less grave forms.51 This hardly makes clear where the 
dividing line lies, an absence of clarity that is particularly unhelpful in the case of cyber 
operations. This begs the question “whether a cyber attack is an action below the threshold of the 
use of force, or a use of force, or a use of force amounting to an armed attack”.52 
                                                          
44 N Melzer, Cyber Warfare and International Law (2011) 11. 
45 MN Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed’ (2012) 54 
Harvard International Law Journal Online 24. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Randelzhofer (n 42) 796.  
48 Dinstein (n 2) 174-7. 
49 Schmitt (n 41) 929. 
50 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) 2003 ICJ Reports 161, para 51. 
51 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 1984 ICJ 
Reports 14, para 191.  
52 M Roscini, ‘World Wide Warfare – Jus ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force’ (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook 
of United Nations Law 114, 130. 
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iv) Notion of a Cyber “Armed” Attack: The concept of “armed attack” under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter necessarily involves intentional employment of weapons or any other forceful means 
against a State from across an international border.53 This invariably raises the question whether 
cyber means of attack constitute weapons.54 This issue has, however, been settled in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion where the International Court of Justice explained that Articles 2(4), 
42 and 51 of the UN Charter apply in respect of any use of force, irrespective of the weapons 
used.55 The position put forth in Nuclear Weapons indicates that cyber means can indeed 
constitute a weapon, provided that they are in fact used intentionally and that they produce 
harmful and internationally wrongful effects on a significant scale.56  
Less certain, however, is the issue concerning the specific threshold of gravity and intensity 
of force required to constitute an “armed attack”.57 That this issue has been very contentious with 
regard to the use of kinetic weapons points to the challenge that is bound to arise is the case of 
cyber operations.58 Indeed, this absence of clarity raises considerable challenges particularly in 
relation to cyber operations because it becomes difficult to determine when such an operation 
would amount to an armed attack justifying resort to lawful self-defence measures contemplated 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter.59 
v) State Responsibility and Attribution: It is a generally accepted rule in international law that 
States bear the international legal responsibility for wrongful conduct that is attributable to 
                                                          
53 Nicaragua (n 51) para 195; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 2004 ICJ 136, para 139; A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (2002) 790. 
54 K Zemanek, ‘Armed Attack’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010) 
para 21.  
55 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 39  
56 This standard is derived from the Nicaragua judgment, para 195. See also Melzer (n 44) 13: “It would thus appear 
that cyber operations have the qualitative capacity to qualify as an ‘armed’ attack within the meaning of article 51 of 
the UN Charter.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Y Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’ in MN Schmitt & B O’Donnell (eds), Computer 
Network Attack and International Law (2002) 105. 
59 MN Schmitt, ‘The Koh Speech and the Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed’ (2012) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 
13, 22: “Whether a cyber use of force qualifies as an armed attack depends on its ‘scale and effects.’ [U]ncertainty 
as to what those scale and effects are plagued the Tallinn Manual deliberations. The Experts observed, for instance, 
that the International Court of Justice differentiated a mere ‘frontier incident’ from an armed attack, but later opined 
that an attack on a single warship might qualify as an armed attack. Such inexplicable distinctions obfuscated their 
attempt to identify practical legal thresholds [footnotes omitted].”  
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them.60 This rule applies similarly in the case of cyber operations, but its practical application is 
very problematic because cyber operations often enlist unsuspecting computers from around the 
world in order to “spin a web of anonymity around the attacker or attackers [thus] making 
accurate attribution uniquely difficult.”61 The practical difficulty of attributing a cyber attack is 
exacerbated by the inherent characteristics of cyber space: anonymity, multi-stage actions, and 
the rapidity with which actions are executed.62 
It is a general rule that the international wrongful cyber conduct of State organs, even when 
they act in official capacity but beyond their instructions, is attributable to the State.63 But this 
rule is less clear in the case of non-State actors who conduct wrongful cyber operations either on 
the specific instruction of or with the encouragement of the State. It is also unclear whether “a 
non-State actor’s cyber operations that are not attributable to a State can nevertheless qualify as 
an armed attack justifying a defensive response at the level of a use of force against that non-
State actor.”64  
Some problematic scenarios illustrate the legal problems that arise in the case of cyber 
operations. Consider the case where the origin of a cyber operation can be traced to cyber 
infrastructure belonging to State A; does this engage the international responsibility of that State 
A? Another instance is where cyber means belonging to or provided by State A falls into the 
hands of insurgents acting against State B, but not under the instruction of State A; does this 
engage the international responsibility of State A? The Stuxnet Worm incident, concerning a 
cyber operation against nuclear centrifuges in Iran, is a clear example of the challenges posed by 
cyber operations with particular regard to attribution.65 
 
 
                                                          
60 See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), UNGA Res A/RES/56/83 
of 12 December 2001; J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002). 
61 OA Hathaway et al, ‘The Law of Cyber Attack’ (2012) 100 California Law Review 817, 823. 
62 N Tsagourias, ‘Cyber Attack, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 233. 
63 See Draft Articles of State Responsibility (n 60) 44-45; Case Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (US v Iran), 1980 ICJ Reports 3, para 74; JP Kesan & CM Hayes, ‘Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense 
and Deterrence in Cyberspace’ (2011-2012) 25 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 482.   
64 Schmitt (n 59) 24. 
65 Richardson (n 26). 
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4.3 Jus in Bello  
Jus in bello consists in the law of armed conflict which is that branch of international law that 
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.66 The following sections highlight some of the 
practical difficulties that are likely to arise when applying existing international law to the new 
and unique characteristics of cyber operations. 
i) Classification of Cyber Conflict: One of the most problematic aspects of cyber operations 
under the jus in bello is their classification; that is, the characterization of the specific type of 
conflict as international, internal or otherwise.67 The difficulty of reliably classifying a particular 
conflict is amplified in the case of cyber operations owing to their uniqueness as non-kinetic 
capabilities that are launched in cyber space.68 First, unlike conventional operations involving 
kinetic weapons, cyber operations are capable of producing massive and widespread disruptive 
effects on a particular society or its economy without necessarily causing any physical damage 
that is often associated with combat action.69  
Secondly, the actors involved in cyber operations may vary from unrelated individuals, 
insufficiently organized groups or groups that are organized but which exist entirely online.70 
This raises significant challenge in trying to determine affiliations for purposes of according the 
consequential legal protection and enforcing compliance with international humanitarian law. 
Thirdly, cyber operations relevant to international law are cross-border and they occur in cyber 
space,71 and this, therefore, complicates the classification of conflict relative to the location of 
the operations.  
Moreover, in the specific context of non-international armed conflict, the collective 
qualification of participants in cyber operations as an organized armed group will present a 
                                                          
66 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994) Publication 1-02. 
67 MN Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Conflict’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 245. 
68 MN Schmitt, ‘War, Technology and International Humanitarian Law’ HPHPCR, Occasional Paper Series 4 
(2005) 43. 
69 WA Owens, KW Dam & HS Lin (eds), Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding US Acquisitions and Use 
of Cyberattack Capabilities (2009) 127.  
70 Schmitt (n 67) 256. 
71 MJ Skelrov, ‘Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active 
Defenses Against States Which Neglect Their Duty to Prevent’ (2009) 201 Military Law Review 1, 62; CC Joyner & 
C Lotrionte, ‘Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework’ (2001) 12 European 
Journal of International Law 825, 865. 
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particular challenge.72 Also, there is sharp division concerning whether the requisite test of 
protracted armed violence73 would be satisfied, thus bringing into effect the law of non-
international armed conflict, in the case of cyber incidents that are not destructive, but which 
nevertheless have severe consequences.74    
ii) Definition of Cyber Attack: The notion of cyber attack under jus in bello is distinct from its 
counterpart under jus ad bellum.75 Under jus in bello, an attack gives rise to prohibitions and 
restraints premised on the principle of distinction, which requires parties to the conflict to “at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”76 Article 49(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
defines an “attack” as an act of “violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence.”  
However, it is not clear what “violence” means, a point that is not satisfactorily explained in 
the ICRC Commentary on the 1977 Additional Protocols.77 This gives rise to important 
contentions regarding whether death, injury or destruction are critical components of the 
foreseeable effects of a cyber “attack”.78 The following questions are suitably illustrative in the 
above regard: i) does a cyber operation which disrupts, interferes or otherwise manipulates the 
functionality of an object without causing any physical damage constitute an “attack”?; and ii) 
does the permanent destruction of banking data files thus causing massive panic among the 
civilian population amount to an “attack”?79     
iii) Distinction: Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I enunciates the principle of 
distinction, one of the cardinal principles of jus in bello;80 it requires parties to an armed conflict 
to at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
                                                          
72 DE Graham, ‘Cyber Threats and the Law of War’ (2010) 4 Journal of National Security Law and Policy 87, 98. 
73 Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1 (2 October 1995) para 70. 
74 K Dörmann, ‘The Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks; An ICRC Viewpoint’ 
in K Byström (ed), International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law (2004).  
75 Dinstein (n 2) 193. 
76 Article 48, Additional Protocol I. 
77 Y Sandoz et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 (1987) para 1679. 
78 Melzer (n 44) 28. 
79 See the factual background of the cyber incident involving massive cyber operations against Estonia. 
80 Nuclear Weapons (n 55) para 78.   
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objects and military objectives, and to direct their operations only against military objectives.81 
Essentially, this principle prohibits direct attack against civilians or civilian objects as well as 
indiscriminate attacks. Although the principle of distinction may appear straightforward, several 
questions regarding its practical application remain unresolved.82 In the particular context of 
cyber operations, an example is an attack on military cyber infrastructure using malicious 
computer virus which subsequently spreads to connected civilian systems.83 The question that 
will arise is whether cyber operations are capable of discriminate application or whether they are 
“blind” weapons.84   
iv) Direct Participation in Cyber Hostilities: The principle of distinction protects civilians only 
for as long as they do not take direct part in hostilities, which entails resort to means and 
methods of killing or injuring the enemy.85 Consequently, when civilians take direct part in 
hostilities, they lose their protection against direct attack and become legitimate military targets 
subject to direct attack.86 It is noteworthy, however, that the notion of “direct participation in 
hostilities” is narrower than the notion of “attack”. Specifically, the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities requires the conduct in question to meet three cumulative criteria: i) it must cause 
death, injury or destruction, or otherwise adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of the opposing party (threshold of harm); ii) it must cause the requisite harm directly 
(direct causation); and iii) it must be designed in order to support one party to the detriment of 
the other (belligerent nexus).87 
It is noteworthy that the concept of direct participation in hostilities is controversial, 
especially as it relates to the targetability of individuals.88 The nature of cyber operations will 
inevitably complicate matters further because it is not clear to establish whether certain conduct 
                                                          
81 Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al, IT-95-16 (2000) para 521. 
82 S Haines, ‘Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare’ in E Wilmshurst & S Breau (eds), Perspectives on the 
ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007) 266; DS Rudesill, ‘Precision War and 
Responsibility: Transformational Military Technology and the Duty of Care under the Laws of War’ (2007) 32 Yale 
Journal of International Law 517, 541.  
83 WH Boothby, Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (2009 OUP) 237. 
84 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, Nuclear Weapons (n 55) 588-89. 
85 Article 51(3) Additional Protocol I. 
86 Nuclear Weapons (n 55) para 78; ICRC, Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols – 
Understanding Humanitarian Law (2009) 36. 
87 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009) 995-96; MN Schmitt, 
‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements’ (2010) 42 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Policy 697. 
88 See Forum: ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities: Perspectives on the ICRC Interpretive Guidance’ (2010) 42 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Policy 637. 
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is intended to support one or more of the parties.89 There is also the possibility that one or more 
of the cumulative criteria for qualification as direct participation in hostilities may not be 
satisfied.90 For instance, would a cyber operation by an individual hacker causing the 
incapacitation of a dual-use transport system or electrical grid constitute a ground for loss of 
protected status, regardless of the fact that it does not result in death, injury or destruction?91 
Likewise, would a cyber operation that is merely disruptive of the adversary’s communication 
network amount to direct participation?92 
5. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
This study aims to explore the key questions that arise from the use of cyber means of warfare 
within the framework of international law on disputes and the use of force and in light of the 
Tallinn Manual. 
6. A NOTE ON THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research focuses on the jus ad bellum (international law governing the resort by States to the 
use of armed force) and the jus in bello (international law governing the conduct of armed 
conflict). This is because an examination of other related regimes of international law (e.g 
telecommunications law, aviation law and space law) will be too broad as to detract from the 
main aim of the present work: to clarify the legal regulation of cyber operations in the context of 
warfare and to speculate on the future of international law in that regard.  
The main object of this research will be those cyber operations to which either the jus ad 
bellum or the jus in bello applies. Accordingly, it only examines legal aspects of military cyber 
operations to the exclusion of legal questions arising from cyber criminality or cyber terrorism. 
In particular, the research will not address cyber activities that do not amount to a “use of force” 
within the meaning of the UN Charter or those which do not meet the threshold of an “armed 
                                                          
89 D Turns, ‘Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2012) 17(2) Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 279, 285. 
90 Ibid at 288. 
91 MN Schmitt, HA Harrison-Dinniss & TC Wingfield, ‘Computers and War: The Legal Battlespace’ Background 
Paper for Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law’ 
(Cambridge 25-27 June 2004).  
92 D Albright, P Brannan & C Walrond, Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Nantaz Enrichment Plant? 
(2010). 
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conflict” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 
1977.93  
7. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter One has identified and explained the selected challenges that cyber operations pose for 
current international law, and these have been supplemented by hypothetical examples that 
illustrate (by means of analogy to conventional warfare) the problematic nature of cyber 
operations and the difficulty of legal regulation. 
Chapter Two provides a background into the development of the Tallinn Manual and 
outlines, among others, the following: its scope; its rules and accompanying commentary; the 
sources and authorities relied upon; the composition of the International Group of Experts; the 
drafting and peer-review process; and the authority of the Tallinn Manual.  
Chapter Three adopts an objective approach to the question of how and if so the extent to 
which the Tallinn Manual has contributed to the clarification of international law applicable to 
cyber operations. This Chapter undertakes a critical appraisal of the merits and demerits of the 
Tallinn Manual with a view to highlighting its positive aspects and to suggesting improvements 
where it is lacking. The Chapter also appraises, in turn, some of the rules pertinent to jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. 
Chapter Four compares the Tallinn Manual, the Naval Warfare Manual and the Turku 
Declaration on Minimum Humanitarian Standards. By comparing the Tallinn Manual to these 
non-binding instruments, this Chapter highlights the importance of non-binding instruments in 
the progressive emergence of binding norms that may prove essential to the effective legal 
regulation of new forms and methods of warfare. This Chapter also explores how the non-
binding rules of the Manual can be transformed into binding norms through State practice. 
Chapter Five, the conclusion, provides a succinct summary of the main findings of the 
research and the suggestions that have been developed in order to enhance the effective legal 
regulation of cyber operations. 
 
                                                          
93 Hathaway (n 61) 26: “Nothing was further from the minds of the drafters of the Geneva Convention than attacks 
carried out over a worldwide computer network.”  
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Chapter II 
THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE: AN OVERVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The utility of cyberspace as an additional94 “domain of warfare”95 presents some challenges to 
current international law,96 but it does not necessarily escape from its constraints.97 The critical 
question that arises is how cyber warfare can be fully regulated by the existing international law. 
This question can satisfactorily be answered by analyzing specific traditional norms that were 
developed for the kinetic context and to assess the extent to which they can be adapted to the 
cyber context.  
The results of the above inquiry can then be used to “identify potential difficulties in their 
application to different types of cyber operations.”98 This was the primary task that the drafters 
of the Tallinn Manual who were styled as the “International Group of Experts” had to address. In 
particular, these Experts were charged with determining how the current rules of international 
law (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) applied to cyber operations, and to “identify any cyber-
unique aspects thereof.”99  
2. CYBER SECURITY AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NATO ALLIANCE 
2.1 Collective Self-Defense Framework of the NATO Alliance 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 as a collective self-
defence organization under the NATO Treaty.100 Since it was founded in the post-World War II 
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period, the NATO Alliance had as its principal object the organization of effective self-defence 
capabilities for Western European nations. These capabilities were meant to thwart Soviet 
aggression and expansionism, which characterized the Cold War period.101 The NATO Alliance 
was also established to safeguard the sovereignty of State parties against the increasing calls for 
secession within their national borders, which in many cases led to violence between the affected 
State and the militant separatists. 
The NATO Treaty was modelled to a large extent on the UN Charter, and this is evident from 
certain key provisions such as the prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence.102 
The very nature of the NATO Treaty, as a multilateral treaty with the main objective of ensuring 
effective collective self-defence, means that its provision which articulates the right of collective 
self-defence is critical. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty enunciates the views of the NATO Allies 
regarding collective self-defence: 
‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack 
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area…’   
The practical significance of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is that it permits the resort by any 
member State to forceful means in the exercise of its collective right of self-defence, whenever 
any member State suffers an armed attack. However, it is useful to recall that not all uses of force 
will trigger the right of self-defence, and thus the initial use of force must rise to the level of an 
“armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.103  
This would appear to present a challenge because it limits the use of collective self-defence 
powers only to cases of such gravity and magnitude as to satisfy the requisite threshold of 
“armed attack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter.104 This also suggests that the aim of protecting 
the collective security of all NATO member nations can only be realized in a very narrow set of 
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cases.105 A cautious approach is appropriate because the NATO Treaty was intended to provide a 
robust legal basis on which to effectively deal with threats to, and ensure the maintenance of 
peace and security over, a vast geographical area.106 Given the expansive nature of its 
geographical field of application, it is only logical that the right of collective self-defence should 
be activated by high-threshold uses of force amounting to an armed attack.107     
However, emerging capabilities require dynamic responses and thus the rigid view that only 
a high-threshold use of force can activate the right of collective self-defence is unsustainable. 
Haußler notes that the drafters of the NATO Treaty had the foresight to include in Article 13 a 
formal mechanism for periodic review of the provisions of the Treaty in light of contemporary 
developments.108 This creates an opportunity to make appropriate amendments to the collective 
security arrangements so as to ensure that the security of member nations is well taken care of. 
But besides amendment, which has been a rare occurrence,109 the NATO Alliance has devised a 
creative means to reinterpret the NATO Treaty without changing its text: strategic concepts.110  
The utility of NATO Strategic Concepts lies in the fact that they are drafted to reflect its 
current doctrine as regards the security environment not only in the Transatlantic region, but also 
in the wider global sphere.111 Another aspect that lends credibility to NATO Strategic Concepts 
is the fact that these documents are typically drafted with a view to providing interpretive 
guidance to member nations as to their legal obligations and policy positions regarding “concrete 
geopolitical circumstances.”112    
The use of Strategic Concepts has proved most useful in providing the grounds to develop 
norms dealing with cyber operations and information warfare.113 In particular, the 2010 NATO 
Strategic Concept outlined the Alliance’s commitment to develop its “ability to prevent, detect, 
defend against, and recover from cyber attacks”.114 It further sets out the means that it can use to 
achieve the above objects, including by using the “NATO planning process to enhance and 
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coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized 
cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with 
member nations”.115  
Subsequently, the NATO Alliance began a process that ultimately led to the adoption in 2013 
of the Tallinn Manual, a process that was undoubtedly propelled by the fact that some of its 
member nations had been targeted in cyber incidents.116 In the following sections, the historical 
development of the NATO Alliance’s interest in cyber capabilities and the move towards a more 
coherent legal and policy response to the increasing incidents of cyber attacks will be discussed 
in more detail. 
2.2 NATO and Interest in Cyber Capabilities 
The self-defence and military capabilities of individual NATO member States vary, but the 
impact of these differences is diminished because the NATO Treaty establishes a robust 
framework for collective security and defence.117 But surprisingly this effective collective 
security capability has not been apparent in the case of cyber operations either conducted by or 
against NATO.118 For a long time the NATO capabilities to effectively defend against all cyber 
threats in the Transatlantic region were considered woefully inadequate, and this was a point that 
most commentators found difficult to understand given NATO’s role as a collective self-defence 
organization.119 For instance, it has been noted that “for an organization tasked with ensuring the 
defense of the Transatlantic region [NATO] still has difficulties in modernizing and updating its 
operational capabilities.”120 Even in cases where creditable attempts have been made, their 
impact has been limited by the use of non-analogous comparisons.121    
An historical examination of how NATO has responded to cyber incidents provides some 
insight into the claims of its lacklustre performance.122 One of the earliest cyber incidents 
targeting NATO was the 1999 Denial of Service attacks that were mounted against websites 
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belonging to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters for the Allied Powers of Europe.123 This cyber 
incident occurred during Operation Allied Force, a campaign that entailed aerial bombardment 
by NATO Allied Forces of Kosovo with a view to defeating military units of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.124     
Although the NATO aerial warfare planners successfully countered this cyber incident, it 
raised the concern of the NATO Alliance as regards its general cyber capabilities, and 
particularly “the security of its military information networks”.125 But it was only in 2002 (three 
years after the event) that NATO came up with a coherent policy response to cyber threats.126 In 
2002, at the Prague Summit, the member nations of the NATO Alliance adopted the Cyber 
Defence Programme, setting out a strategy to combat cyber threats and to enhance 
cooperation.127 This Programme was also intended to be the blueprint for the continuous 
development, acquisition, and implementation of collective cyber-defence capabilities.128 
However, the Cyber Defence Programme was not fully implemented, and as a consequence there 
was little progress in updating the NATO Alliance’s operational capabilities to effectively defend 
against cyber threats.129    
2.3 NATO Cyber Security and Defence Post-Estonia 
The 2007 cyber operations against Estonia, a member State of NATO, renewed the interest of 
NATO in the field of cyber security and defence.130 The cyber operations against Estonia marked 
a turning point in the manner in which NATO dealt with the issue of cyber security and defence 
largely because it was the first time that a member nation came under sustained cyber attack with 
adverse physical effects and massive economic disruption.   
Consequently, in 2008, the Cooperative Cyber-Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) 
and the Cyber Defense Management Agency (CDMA) were formally established as international 
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military organizations under the auspices of NATO. Since the NATO CCD COE forms part of 
the wider educational “framework supporting NATO Command Arrangements,”131 it produces 
non-mandatory documents setting out rules of engagement. Member nations of NATO are 
required to sign memoranda of understanding before agreeing to be bound by the various 
mandates or to become part of these operations.132 At the moment less than half (eleven out of 
twenty eight) of the NATO member nations participate in the operations of the NATO CCD 
COE.   
In 2009, the NATO CCD COE invited an independent “International Group of Experts” to 
produce a manual outlining the international law applicable to cyber operations, resulting in the 
Tallinn Manual.133 It is also significant to note that in November 2010, NATO adopted a 
Strategic Concept (a broad outline of its ten-year strategic objectives) that emphasized the 
critical importance of improving its capabilities for cyber security and defence.134 It identified a 
growing trend in the militarization of cyberspace and also noted the relevant security 
implications: “[c]yber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly in 
the damage that they inflict” and they “can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-
Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.”135 In this regard, the 2010 Strategic Concept called 
upon all NATO member nations to develop their collective cyber security capacity in order to 
further the ability “to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber attacks, including 
by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence 
capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber-protection, and better integrating 
NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations”.136 
3. CYBER OPERATIONS AND CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 
As has been stated above,137 the drafters of the Tallinn Manual concluded that both the 
international law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict apply to cyber operations.138 
But the Manual does not provide any detailed explanation as to how this view was arrived at. Yet 
                                                          
131 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 1 at footnote 2. 
132 Check (n 101) 17. 
133 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 1. 
134 NATO (n 34). 
135 NATO (n 34) para 12. 
136 Ibid at 16-17. 
137 See Section 4.1 of Chapter 1. 
138 Tallinn Manual (n 8) 5. 
23 
 
this is important in providing justification for the extension of rules that apply in the kinetic 
context into the cyber realm. The following section seeks to supply justification for the 
application of current international law to cyber operations. 
3.1 Legal Basis in the Law of Treaties 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists treaties as one of the sources of international law and, more 
importantly, lists it among the two key sources.139 Treaties are international agreements 
“concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation”.140 If it is accepted that treaty law applies to cyber operations which rise to the level 
of a use of force or an armed conflict despite the fact that there is no treaty to this effect, the 
critical legal question that follows is: what is the legal basis for this view? The specific treaty 
that deals with the use of force in international relations is the UN Charter, while the law of 
armed conflict is governed by the 1907 Hague Conventions,141 the Geneva Conventions of 
1949,142 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.143 
An examination of the dates when the above treaties were adopted shows that they all 
predated the age of cyber warfare and thus provide little specific guidance as to the legal 
regulation of cyber operations. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), whose rules reflect customary international law,144 offers a solution by allowing 
progressive interpretation of established treaty provisions in order to take account of current or 
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prospective cases, provided that there is agreement amongst the parties.145 This concept is 
implicit in Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT which provides that treaties shall be interpreted in a 
manner that takes into account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” 
Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT supports the contention that treaties are not static; rather, they 
are dynamic instruments and thus should be interpreted so as to take account of new and 
emerging contexts.146 The necessity of a dynamic approach to treaty interpretation has been 
endorsed by the ICJ in its South West Africa Advisory Opinion, where the Court observed that 
“an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”.147 This approach has been reaffirmed in 
the subsequent case law of the ICJ.148 
In the context of cyber operations, the dynamic approach postulated in the South West Africa 
Advisory Opinion would require the relevant treaty law (i.e, the UN Charter, the Geneva 
Conventions etc.) to be interpreted so as to take the increasing prevalence of cyber threats into 
consideration.149 Accordingly, the current law should be read with appropriate modification so as 
to govern cyber operations.150 This is consistent with the requirement of construing treaty law 
not in isolation, but in concert with the actual prevailing circumstances and in the appropriate 
context of application.151 It has also been regarded as essential to interpret certain treaty 
provisions in light of the subsequent practice of State parties to the relevant treaties.152 
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The jurisprudence of the ICJ provides further support for the interpretation of current treaty 
law so as to effectively extend legal regulation into the cyber realm.153 In Dispute Regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights the ICJ elaborated the notion of dynamic treaty interpretation, 
holding that: 
‘Where parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that 
the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered 
into for a very long period or is of ‘continuing duration’, the parties must be presumed, as a 
general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning’.154      
Key concepts that are addressed in the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, such as “self-
defence” or “civilians”, are generic and their continued use is contemplated in the foreseeable 
future.155  
It is reasonable to conclude that the drafters of these treaties could not have intended the 
interpretation of these concepts to be outpaced by future developments; otherwise, the treaties 
would be redundant.156 The evolutive capacity of the UN Charter with particular regard to the 
concept of “self-defence” in Article 51 has been supported in legal doctrine: “the rules on treaty 
interpretation and on the sources of international law do not exclude the possibility that Art 51 is 
reinterpreted, including on the basis of subsequent practice.”157 Given that a cyber operation 
rising to the level of an armed attack would trigger the victim State’s right of self-defence, it 
would defeat the purpose of the UN Charter if cyber operations are excluded from its scope of 
application.158   
The application of the treaty law of armed conflict is supported by the Martens Clause. 
Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), which codifies the Martens Clause, provides that in 
cases not covered by treaty law, “civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”159 The Commentary to this 
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provision clarifies that the Martens Clause rebuts the discredited view that acts not expressly 
prohibited by the relevant treaties are permitted.160  
More importantly, with specific regard to cyber operations, the Martens Clause reaffirms the 
view that the treaty law of armed conflict continues to apply “regardless of subsequent 
developments of types of situation or technology”.161 Indeed, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion the ICJ concurred that the Martens Clause provides an “effective means of addressing 
the rapid evolution of military technology”.162 This supports the continued application of the 
customary law of armed conflict irrespective of modern technological advancements.     
Besides the jurisprudence of the ICJ, there is support for the view that current treaty law 
applies to cyber operations in the practice of States and international organizations.163 Article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT offers a legal basis for the application of current law in cyber space, but it 
is vital to look at actual practice in order to ascertain the extent to which the words of this 
provision have been given effect in the conduct of States and international organizations.164 
Indeed, the International Law Commission acknowledges the importance of examining practice 
because “it constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of 
the treaty”.165          
3.1.1 Affirmative Practice of States 
Some States have accepted that the mere absence of specific treaty rules governing cyber 
operations does not render the existing treaty law norms (some of which have attained customary 
status) inapplicable.166 The practice of the United States is illustrative in this regard.167 In 2011, 
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the United States adopted its International Strategy for Cyberspace in which it took the position 
that: 
‘The development of norms for State conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of 
customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-
standing international norms guiding State behaviour – in times of peace and conflict – also apply 
in cyberspace’.168 
Apart from the United States, other nations have also expressly acknowledged that certain 
provisions of current treaty law apply to cyber operations conducted by States.169 For instance, as 
early as 2000 the Russian Government had already adopted conceptual views relating to the 
international legal norms, particularly from the UN charter, that should guide the conduct of 
Russian forces when undertaking operations in cyberspace.170 Likewise, the Dutch Government 
has affirmed that certain aspects of treaty law extend to the cyber realm.171 
Official pronouncements by States may also provide a useful indicator of the stance adopted 
by the relevant State as regards a particular issue.172 Even more convincing as evidence of State 
practice are official comments or observations presented to organs of the United Nations.173 In 
this regard, the views formally submitted by States (on the issue of information security) to the 
UN Secretary-General also demonstrate that there is a significant level of acceptance of the 
application of treaty norms in the cyber context. Notable examples of States that have taken this 
view include: the United Kingdom,174 Australia,175 and Cuba.176    
3.1.2 Affirmative Practice of International Organizations 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has consistently maintained that the treaty 
law of armed conflict (particularly, the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions) 
governs the conduct of belligerents, regardless of the type of weapons or the technology used.177 
This position has remained essentially unchanged in the case of cyber means and methods of 
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warfare; it holds that cyber technology, like any other kinetic weapon, is governed by 
international humanitarian law. This view was articulated in a 2011 analytical report, where the 
ICRC explained that:   
‘means and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology are subject to IHL [international 
humanitarian law] just as any new weapon or delivery system has been so far when used in an 
armed conflict by or on behalf of a party to such conflict. If a cyber-operation is used against an 
enemy in an armed conflict in order to cause damage, for example by manipulation of an air 
traffic control system that results in the crash of a civilian aircraft, it can hardly be disputed that 
such an attack is in fact a method of warfare and is subject to prohibitions under IHL’.178    
Similarly, the UN General Assembly has adopted a report which supports the view that 
current treaty law applies in the context of, and forms the basis for, regulating cyber 
operations.179 Indeed the Report of the third180 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
established by the UN General Assembly made the key point that international law, and in 
particular the Charter of the United Nations, is not only applicable but is essential to maintaining 
peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible information and 
communications technologies environment.181 The fact that this GGE Report was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly is significant because it reflects the extensive acceptance of this view 
among member States of the United Nations. 
The European Union is also another international organization that has recognized the 
applicability of existing international treaty law to cyber operations conducted by States.182 More 
specifically, the 2013 Cyber Strategy of the European Union emphasizes the critical role played 
by international treaty law in general, and more specifically the UN Charter, in providing the 
basis for engagement in cyberspace.183 As a regional body, the views articulated in the above 
strategy can safely be taken as a reflection of the views of the constitutive nations that form the 
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European Union. The practice of certain States that are members of the European Union clearly 
support this view.184     
3.2 Legal Basis in Customary International Law 
Legal obligations arising from treaty law are limited in their effect because they bind only those 
States that have consented to be so bound.185 However, in some instances, the binding effect of 
some treaty norms is enhanced because the norms have attained customary status186 or reflect a 
general principle of law.187 Customary international law, defined as “evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law”,188 binds all States, with the possible exception of persistent 
objectors.189 Customary norms are evidenced by two elements which indicate the formation of a 
rule of customary international law, namely State practice and opinio juris.190 
3.2.1 State Practice and Opinio Juris 
The element of practice in the formation of customary international law requires that the relevant 
conduct, i.e the observation of a certain rule, has been complied with by a representative number 
of States.191 It is useful to note that this element is qualitative in nature, placing less emphasis on 
the number of States and more on the relationship that exists between the States and the norm at 
issue.192 Evidence of practice is not limited to the conduct of States, but may be derived from the 
conduct of other subjects of international law, including international organizations.193 The 
following are indicative material sources of the practice of a State:  
‘diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of legal advisors, 
official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and 
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practices, orders to naval forces etc., comments by governments produced by International Law 
Commission, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and 
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international 
organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly’.194 
The element of opinio juris denotes the subjective aspect and it requires the relevant conduct 
of States or other subjects of international law (practice) to occur in “such a way as to show a 
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”195 Absent evidence as to a 
belief in the presence of a prescriptive rule that establishes the basis for observing a particular 
practice, it may be sufficient to rely on the imperative force of necessity as the basis for that 
conduct.196 The material sources that are relied on to demonstrate practice are also evidentiary 
sources of opinio juris; in fact, the International Law Association (ILA) has observed that it is 
often difficult or even “impossible to disentangle the two elements.”197 Therefore, official 
statements of States, including national policy statements198 and manuals of military law, and 
other representative pronouncements may indicate opinio juris.199 
With specific regard to the question of the regulation of cyber operations, customary 
international law provides a crucial legal basis for constraining State conduct within the limits of 
the law. In particular, as a general rule, customary norms applicable to kinetic operations also 
apply, in more or less the same way, to “cyber operations amounting to a use of force or acts of 
hostilities.”200 This general rule derives from the logic that norms of a customary nature, 
especially regarding the use of weapons and technology, cannot be expected to develop 
selectively.201 Instead, the better view is that customary norms should develop in a manner that is 
general enough to govern any type of weapon or technology.202 Otherwise, there will be a 
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recurrent duplicity of effort in trying to identify the customary norms relevant to “every concrete 
weapon employed in armed attack.”203 
An examination of the practice of States and the opinio juris indicates a general acceptance 
of the fact that cyber operations constituting a use of force or the conduct of hostilities are 
subject to the respective customary norms of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.204 In light of 
the scarcity of State cyber practice (drawn from cyber incidents that can clearly be attributed to 
States),205 other evidentiary sources such as manuals of military law and operational conduct 
become instructive. While the actual operational conduct of a State would arguably provide more 
conclusive evidence as to its practice,206 national military manuals have the additional advantage 
of providing an indication of what the State has declared as well as its attitude regarding the 
existence of a legal rule.207 It has also been observed that practice is essentially about what States 
clearly declare as their intent, and not necessarily what they do.208    
Military manuals are particularly relevant since they constitute both State practice and 
evidence of opinio juris.209 The utility of such manuals is enhanced in the case of cyber 
operations because most States that have been linked to recent cyber incidents have either denied 
involvement or dissimulated their roles,210 thus making it very difficult to ascertain State cyber 
practice.211 This special role of military manuals has been recognized in international 
jurisprudence; in particular, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that where information 
on the actual conduct of States is either unavailable or is being withheld by the parties, recourse 
can be made to military manuals.212 Considering that State cyber practice is sparse, an 
examination of military manuals can offer vital insight into the extent of practice and opinio 
juris.  
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An example of a military manual that contemplates the regulation of cyber warfare is the 
United States Commander’s Handbook which affirms that the long-established rules that apply to 
kinetic naval operations also extend to cyber operations.213 Similarly, the British Manual states 
that cyber operations are subject to certain key rules of the law of armed conflict.214 Other States 
that have a special interest in cyber warfare, e.g., Israel and China, are in the process of updating 
their military manuals to effectively address cyber operations.215       
Apart from military manuals, other official pronouncements of States such as policy 
statements intended to guide operational conduct are also useful evidentiary sources of practice 
and opinio juris.216 This view is supported by the jurisprudence of the ICJ, which has held that 
the conduct of any organ of a State, including the conduct of State officials, “must be regarded as 
an act of that State.”217 An illustrative example can be found in the International Strategy for 
Cyberspace of the United States, which makes clear that the “development of norms for state 
conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it 
render existing international norms obsolete.”218   
3.2.2 An Emerging Relaxed Approach 
The above discussion on practice and opinio juris raises the question as to whether it can be said 
that cyber-specific customary norms may be in the process of developing. The predominant view 
is that the dual requirements of State practice and opinio juris must be satisfied for the customary 
status of a particular norm to be established.219 However, a novel view is emerging that the 
determination of new rules of custom can be carried out according to less strict criteria than were 
originally envisaged.220 This suggests that the strict approach is giving way to a more relaxed 
approach. 
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Two key points need to be highlighted in order to illustrate this emerging relaxed approach to 
the formation of international custom.221 First, while evidence of practice was initially 
exclusively derived from actions of States, the current view admits of verbal acts as evidence of 
the acceptance of certain norms.222 Indeed, the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law includes opinions of official legal advisors, including their verbal statements, 
as evidence of State practice.223 Verbal acts have also been expressly considered to be sufficient 
evidence of State practice by the International Law Association224 and certain influential legal 
commentators.225 Also, the strict requirement that State practice must be “extensive and virtually 
uniform” has been relaxed such that the practice of few specially affected States would suffice to 
establish that a “general practice accepted as law” has crystallized.226 This is supported by the 
ILA Statement of Principles which emphasizes that the requisite State practice is more of a 
qualitative nature: “if all major interests (‘specially affected States”) are represented, it is not 
essential for a majority of States to have participated”.227 
The second point that shows the emergence of a relaxed approach to the formation of 
customary international law is the decisive role that opinio juris has come to play in recent 
times.228 Originally, State practice was considered the objective basis on which to establish the 
presence of a customary norm, while opinio juris was deemed subjective in the sense that it 
supplemented a conclusion largely premised on practice.229 However, in new and emerging 
contexts (such as the use of new technologies) where State practice is either sparse or difficult to 
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determine, opinio juris becomes more determinative.230 This position is supported by 
international jurisprudence231 and international legal doctrine.232 
What then does the emergence of a relaxed approach to the formation of customary 
international law hold for cyber-specific norms? The drafters of the Tallinn Manual state that due 
to the scarcity of State cyber practice and publicly available expressions of opinio juris, “it is 
sometimes difficult to definitively conclude that any cyber-specific customary international law 
norm exists.”233 The cautious tenor of the above statement is understandable because the Tallinn 
Manual was keen to avert any criticism that it was stipulating unsupported norms.234  
However, the cautious stance taken by the Tallinn Manual does not exclude the possibility 
that “customary international law rules specific to cyber warfare might be in the process of 
forming and eventually ripening.”235 This view is persuasive because if it is accepted that current 
treaty and customary norms extend to the cyber context then it follows that cyber-specific norms 
are in the process of developing, at least, in respect of certain aspects relating to the conduct of 
cyber operations by States.236 Otherwise, given the complete absence of specific treaty law 
provisions governing cyber operations, the cyber conduct of States would be left unregulated. 
3.3 Applicability of Current Norms to Cyber Operations 
The preceding discussion has shown that cyber operations that are conducted either in the 
context of the use of force or an armed conflict are subject to both customary and treaty law. But 
what is less clear is how and to what extent the treaty law provisions and customary law specific 
to kinetic operations can be applied in the cyber context. To answer this question, it is necessary 
to first examine the norms that apply in kinetic operations and identify how these norms can be 
adapted to the cyber context, with special focus on the unique aspects of cyberspace.  
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This is the approach that was adopted by the drafters of the Tallinn Manual who sought to 
identify and elaborate how the existing international law applies to cyber operations that rise to 
the threshold of a use of force or acts of hostilities. This exercise, which was conducted by 
renowned experts serving in their personal capacities,237 resulted in the adoption of 95 Rules 
governing cyber operations. In addition, each of the Rules is accompanied by an extensive 
Commentary that explains the legal basis of the Rule and outlines any points of contention, 
whether among the drafters or in the legal doctrine.238  
4. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has examined the background of the Tallinn Manual, highlighting its origins from 
the NATO collective self-defence documents to its eventual conclusion as a Manual. The 
relevant discussion in the Chapter has also outlined the legal basis for extending the current law 
to cyber operations, demonstrating that this view has a legal basis in treaty and customary 
international law. Accordingly, it finds that the position taken at the outset by the drafters of the 
Tallinn Manual is valid and is supported both in law and in practice. The main point highlighted 
in this Chapter is the need for progressive development of international law because the Manual 
is not an attempt to present a comprehensive account of the applicable rules.  
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Chapter III 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE TALLINN MANUAL 
TO THE CLARIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATIVE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The potentially adverse consequences of cyber operations that can disrupt and destroy critical 
aspects of modern societies highlight the crucial need for a coherent legal framework that 
governs the use of cyber technology in international relations.239 The Tallinn Manual comes as 
an attempt to fill the gap of legal regulation of cyber operations in international law, an area that 
was not specifically codified by traditional international law.240 In fact, one of the explicitly 
stated objects of the Tallinn Manual is to supply “some degree of clarity to the complex legal 
issues surrounding cyber operations, with particular attention [being] paid to those involving the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.”241  
The Tallinn Manual sets forth specific Rules that establish a framework for the legal 
regulation of cyber operations and each of these are accompanied by a Commentary setting out 
the Rule’s legal basis and explaining its interpretation vis-à-vis current norms. The present 
chapter reviews the extent to which selected Rules of the Tallinn Manual have contributed 
towards clarifying some of the complex issues of international law surrounding cyber operations. 
PART I   JUS AD BELLUM 
2. A CRITIQUE OF JUS AD BELLUM RULES IN THE TALLINN MANUAL 
This section analyzes selected jus ad bellum Rules by critically discussing their legal basis then 
assessing their practical utility as regards the novel phenomenon of cyber attacks. The analysis 
will explore important questions regarding whether a cyber operation may constitute a use of 
force giving rise to the right of self-defence, within the specific meaning of the UN Charter and 
customary international law. 
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2.1 Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force 
The Tallinn Manual explicitly prohibits the use of cyberspace or the employment of cyber 
technology in a manner that amounts to a threat or use of force against a State. In particular, Rule 
10 stipulates that a “cyber operation that constitutes a threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful.”242 This rule is based on both treaty and 
customary international law.243  
Rule 10 adopts an expansive approach that recognizes that the prohibition of threats or uses 
of force contrary to the UN Charter applies to States as well as to non-State actors. This is 
apparent in the commentary to this Rule, which explains that on the basis of customary law this 
prohibition extends to non-State actors, subject to a finding of attribution of their unlawful acts to 
a State.244 The commentary to Rule 10 also explains, with reference to the preparatory 
documents of the UN Charter, that the phrase threats or uses of force “in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” establishes a presumption of illegality of 
any conduct inconsistent with the UN Charter, even if it is not directed against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a State.245 
An important issue addressed in Rule 10 is that cyber operations not amounting to a use of 
force are not necessarily lawful under international law. This is important because it prevents any 
gap in the legal regulation of cyber operations. By holding that cyber incidents not rising to a use 
of force may still constitute a violation of the prohibition on intervention, the Rule 10 effectively 
ensures that even where there is doubt there will be little room to avoid liability.246  
However, the above explanation in the commentary to Rule 10 is not entirely 
unproblematic.247 For one, the UN Charter outlines many purposes and there is the possibility 
that these may clash; for example, support for the right to self-determination may clash with 
imperatives of maintaining international peace. Hence, the prohibition expressed in Rule 10 is 
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less clear insofar as it does not elaborate whether the use of the phrase “in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” was intended to be an inclusive basis for 
outlawing invasive cyber operations.248   
Another challenging issue is defining the threshold of intervention. In answering this 
question, the Tallinn Manual relies on the Nicaragua judgment where the ICJ stated that the 
determinative element is coercion: “interference pure and simple is not intervention … 
intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion”.249 The range and nature of cyber 
operations make it difficult to determine with certainty whether a particular cyber incident 
constitutes an intervention or whether it constitutes a use of force. This point is acknowledged by 
the Tallinn Manual which uses the example of the Stuxnet attack and the cracking of passwords 
to illustrate the scope of intervention. In the final analysis it emphasizes the point that the 
decisive test is that of coercion.250 
2.2 Definition of Threat of Force 
Rule 12 of the Tallinn Manual states that: “A cyber operation, or threatened cyber operation, 
constitutes an unlawful threat of force when the threatened action, if carried out, would be an 
unlawful use of force.”251 This rule has its legal basis in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as 
elaborated by the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, where the Court distinguished 
between lawful and unlawful threats of force: 
‘[t]he notions of “threat” and “use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand 
together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal—for whatever reason—
the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal’.252  
Consequently, the ICJ explained that if a specific threat of force “is to be lawful, the declared 
readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the [UN] 
Charter.”253 Hence, Rule 12 of the Tallinn Manual reflects the generally accepted position that a 
threatened cyber operation would be lawful if the threatened action would itself be consistent 
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with the UN Charter in the event that it is carried out.254 More specifically, a threatened cyber 
operation would be lawful if the threatened action, if carried out, would constitute a legitimate 
exercise of the right of self-defence or an action implementing a UN Security Council resolution 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
While the Tallinn Manual’s distinction of lawful from unlawful cyber threats of force 
accords with current international legal doctrine, it nevertheless lends itself to some ambiguity. 
For one, it is unclear whether a cyber use of force, say for humanitarian intervention, will be 
lawful if the force used exceeds what is necessary in the short-term but may be justifiable in the 
longer term.255 Another ambiguity lies in the fact that it is often difficult to assess the lawfulness 
of a use of force, including cyber force, if certain requisite elements (i.e, necessity, 
proportionality, imminence and immediacy) cannot objectively and conclusively be evaluated at 
the time of the threat.256 
Rule 12 of the Tallinn Manual, as elaborated in its commentary, takes the view that the 
aggressive acquisition by a State of cyber capabilities is not in itself an unlawful threat to use 
force.257 Rather it is the announcement that the capabilities will be used to conduct cyber 
operations against another State.258 This view is not convincing because it fails to take account of 
several important factors, including the geopolitical alliances that the aggressor State may have. 
The presumption that mere acquisition will not constitute a threat of force is also not supported 
by State practice, as illustrated by the 1967 Cuban missile crisis.259 Accordingly, the rigid and 
categorical position adopted in the Tallinn Manual is imprudent because it is inadequate in 
theory and unsupported in practice.        
2.3 State Responsibility and Attribution 
Rule 10 of the Tallinn Manual explicitly prohibits the threat or use of cyber force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State. It also proscribes cyber operations that 
are inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Accordingly, any cyber action 
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amounting to a threat or use of force will become an internationally wrongful act, with the 
consequence that legal responsibility will attach to its author(s). This calls into focus the special 
rules on legal responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, which have been articulated by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in its Articles on State Responsibility.260 Moreover, the 
rules applicable to attribution become relevant in cases where the authors of an internationally 
unlawful cyber operation are not agents of the State, but are nonetheless linked to the State. 
Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual provides that a State will bear “international legal responsibility 
for a cyber operation attributable to it and which constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation.”261 This Rule is based on customary law as articulated in the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility.262 Of particular interest is the Commentary to Rule 6 which elaborates the 
standards for the attribution of international responsibility. It must be borne in mind that there are 
primarily three different classes of actors that are typically involved in the conduct of cyber 
operations.263 First, there are “organs of the State” which include both civilian and military State 
agents,264 provided they act in accordance with internal legislation.265 Secondly, there are civilian 
militias which consist in more or less organized individuals without the status of State agents 
under the internal law of the relevant State, but who may act under the direction of that State.266 
Thirdly, there are those independent citizen hackers who operate autonomously or in concert 
with other hackers.  
The rules for attribution in the case of a State organ are fairly straight forward and well 
settled; that is, the conduct of any State organ is considered to be that of the State, regardless of 
its function or place in governmental hierarchy.267 This is the position taken by the Tallinn 
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Manual, which recognizes that cyber attacks may be committed by State organs268 or persons or 
entities that, while not organs of that State, are specifically empowered by its domestic law to 
exercise governmental authority.269 But in the case of completely autonomous or semi-dependent 
groups of hackers, the rules are less clear.270 The commentary to Rule 6 elaborates that the acts 
of such individuals or groups will be attributable to the sponsoring State if they were in fact 
carried out under the instruction, direction or control of that State, a view that restates article 8 of 
the Articles of State Responsibility.271 
However, the threshold of control at which acts of non-State entities can engage the 
international responsibility of a State is contentious. There is considerable disagreement as to 
whether the requisite degree of control should be “overall control” in all cases of acts of non-
State actors or whether it should be “effective control” in the case of citizen hackers and 
unorganized cyber volunteers and “overall control” in the case of organized groups.272 The 
effective control test was articulated by the ICJ in Nicaragua273 (and later clarified in the 
Genocide judgment)274 where it was explained that, for responsibility to attach, it must be proved 
that the State had effective control of an operation which resulted in internationally wrongful acts 
or that the State’s instructions were given in respect of each unlawful action. The Genocide 
judgment specifies that the threshold of effective control requires a State to have exercised 
control over specific acts and “not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons 
or groups of persons having committed the violations.”275  
By contrast, the “overall control” test which was adopted in Tadić is a less stringent standard; 
it only requires evidence that a State had a role in facilitating, organizing, coordinating or 
planning the actions of a non-State entity, “regardless of any specific instructions by the 
controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts”.276 Moreover, unlike the 
effective control standard, the overall control test focuses not so much on “control over the act, 
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but over the actor, an organized and hierarchically structured group, at a general level.”277 
According to the present author, the overall control test appears more appropriate for attributing 
acts of organized groups, while the effective control test would be more fitting in the case of 
individuals and unorganized groups.278 The view of the present author is convincing in light of 
the inherent anonymity of cyber operations and the difficulty of identifying the perpetrators.279  
Surprisingly, the Tallinn Manual does not state a definite position regarding which standard 
of attribution is the more appropriate test for determining whether State responsibility 
attaches.280 Instead, it merely explains in the commentary to Rule 6 that even if the lower 
“overall control” test were to be adopted in respect of cyber operations, it would not apply to 
individuals or unorganized groups.281 This implicitly supports the adoption of the stringent 
effective control test in the case of individuals or groups that are not militarily organized and the 
adoption of the less restrictive overall control standard in the case of organized groups. This 
notwithstanding, the Tallinn Manual could have been more forthright in order to provide a ruling 
on the current position in the law of State responsibility.           
Rule 7 of the Tallinn Manual provides that: “The mere fact that a cyber operation has been 
launched or otherwise originates from governmental cyber infrastructure is not sufficient 
evidence for attributing the operation to that State, but is an indicator that the State in question is 
associated with the operation.”282 This Rule supports the view that the standards for attribution 
may be adopted in appropriate circumstances because it does not exclude that cyber operations 
launched from State cyber infrastructure can be the basis for attaching international 
responsibility. Hence, going by the standards of cognizable “unwillingness” or “toleration” by 
action or selective inaction, unlawful cyber operations can be attributed to a State if there is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that “the state tolerates such attacks to be launched from its 
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infrastructure or willingly fails to safeguard its governmental cyber infrastructure.”283 This view 
is supported in international law and practice.284 
Despite the fact that the flexible standards of “unwillingness” or “toleration” have been 
upheld in international practice285 and endorsed by influential legal writers,286 the commentary to 
Rule 7 does not expressly state that this is the correct interpretation, more so in the cyber 
context.287 This omission deprives the Tallinn Manual a vital opportunity to encourage States to 
be vigilant so as to prevent the use of their infrastructure in furtherance of internationally 
unlawful ends. In light of the UN Charter’s provisions and international case law, there is an 
obligation on all States, in the exercise of sovereignty, not to allow their territory to be used as a 
launch-pad of unlawful acts.288 Such conduct may entail international responsibility of the 
offending State.   
Indeed, it is a rule of customary international law that States have a fundamental duty not to 
“allow knowingly” their territories to be used in a manner that is “contrary to the rights of other 
States”.289 The effect of this customary rule is to impose a specific obligation on States to take 
appropriate steps to ensure their territorial integrity so as to protect the rights of others.290 It is 
therefore the opinion of the present author that the Tallinn Manual advocates too flexible a 
standard for the attribution of cyber attacks launched from governmental infrastructure and it is 
likely to facilitate rather than check unlawful acts.    
The commentary to Rule 7 also states that “[i]n and of itself, the Rule does not serve as a 
legal basis for taking any action against the State involved or otherwise holding it responsible for 
the acts in question.”291 This explanation is problematic because it fails to recognize the key role 
that attribution has in determining the bearer of responsibility for unlawful conduct and 
identifying the legitimate “target of counter force.”292 But it is possible to appreciate the logic of 
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the above statement when it is considered in context. Certain States, particularly the less 
developed and technologically unsophisticated ones, may be genuinely be unable to prevent non-
State entities from taking control of its cyber infrastructure and using it to conduct unlawful acts. 
It follows that such States would be unfairly prejudiced by a legal standard that attaches 
responsibility merely because of a failure to prevent, regardless of the circumstances of the case. 
Hence, the correct standard should take account of the specific facts on a case-by-case basis. 
2.4 Self-Defence against Armed Attack 
Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual provides that: “A State that is the target of a cyber operation that 
rises to the level of an armed attack may exercise its inherent right of self-defence. Whether a 
cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and effects.” Part of this rule is a 
restatement of the principle enunciated in Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” This 
provision and particularly the use of the words “inherent right” reflect the customary right of 
self-defence.293 
Rule 13 thus confirms that the right to employ force in self-defence applies to armed cyber 
attacks that are of such a scale and whose adverse effects are analogous to those that ordinarily 
attend kinetic armed attacks.294 However, it does not provide any further explanation as to which 
uses of force can trigger the right of self-defence.295 In fact, the commentary to Rule 13 observes 
that the ICJ did not clarify how the gravity of an attack can be measured,296 but it did not attempt 
to provide any useful guidance that could remedy that omission.297 Nonetheless, the fact that 
Rule 13 implies that the requisite scale and effects are those analogous to kinetic attacks suggests 
that a cyber operation would only amount to an armed attack if it results in death, injury or 
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destruction.298 It would be sufficient for a finding of an armed attack if these conditions are 
satisfied disjunctively.   
2.4.1 Grave and Less Grave Uses of Cyber Force 
There was unanimous consensus amongst the International Group of Experts that some cyber 
operations may, independently, be sufficiently grave as to constitute an “armed attack” within 
the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.299 This position finds support in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion where the ICJ stated that the choice of means of attack, whether 
kinetic or non-kinetic, has little bearing on the qualification of its consequent employment as an 
armed attack.300 This view also accords with State practice.301  
While the notion of a cyber operation having the capacity to constitute an armed attack thus 
triggering the right of self-defence secured viable consensus, the issue of the threshold at which a 
cyber operation qualifies as an armed attack was more contentious. Most commentators insist 
that in order to meet the requisite threshold of armed attack, the relevant use of force must be on 
a relatively large scale and with substantial effect.302 But this view is not uncontested; the 
position of the United States in this regard is that:     
‘the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. In our view, 
there is no threshold for a use of deadly force to qualify as an “armed attack” that may warrant a 
forcible response’.303 
The divergent viewpoints illustrated above result from the finding of the ICJ in Nicaragua, 
which is wholly adopted in Rule 13, that not every use of force amounts to an “armed attack” for 
purposes of the right of self-defence. Accordingly, the Tallinn Manual upholds the Nicaragua 
categorization of uses of force into grave and less grave ones, with the consequence that the right 
of self-defence is only exercisable in respect of the former.304 The raises the problem of how the 
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“scale and effects” of a cyber operation can be measured and the threshold at which it can be 
considered as having risen to the level of an “armed attack” warranting self-defence action.305 
The practical effect of the uncertainty surrounding the distinction between grave and less 
grave uses of cyber force can be illustrated by reference to actual cyber incidents. An example is 
the 2007 cyber operation launched against Estonia which was never clearly characterized as an 
armed attack.306 Another instance is the 2010 cyber operation that did extensive damage to 
Iranian centrifuges; unlike the Estonian case, there was sharp division among the drafters of the 
Tallinn Manual, with some holding that Stuxnet was an armed attack while others seemingly 
disputing this view.307         
2.4.2 Differentiated Uses of Cyber Force and “Accumulation of Effects” 
The view taken by the International Group of Experts and supported by the Nicaragua case308 
that not every use of cyber force amounts to an armed attack is related to another important 
issue: whether a State may exercise its right of self-defence in response to a series of cyber 
attacks that would not constitute an armed attack if taken individually.309 Proceeding from the 
position that an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter is distinct 
from, and requires a higher threshold than, a “use of force” within the meaning of Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, the critical legal question is: can individual cyber uses of force amount to an 
armed attack if aggregated, thereby giving rise to the right of a victim State to respond forcibly in 
self-defence?  
The commentary to Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual answers the above question in the 
affirmative and thus supports the “accumulation of effects” theory, which holds that there may 
be cases where individual incidents falling below the threshold of armed attack can be 
considered cumulatively to amount to an armed attack.310 The specific view adopted by the 
Tallinn Manual is that: if there is “convincing evidence” indicating that the same “originator (or 
originators acting in concert) has carried out smaller-scale incidents that are related and that 
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taken together have the requisite scale” then the incidents may be treated as a “composite armed 
attack”.311  
Three problems arise from the position taken above. First, the commentary to Rule 13 of the 
Tallinn Manual does not set out the legal basis for its adoption of the “accumulation of effects 
theory”, a theory that is contested both in international legal doctrine312 as well as in practice.313 
It would have been more prudent to set out the basis of this theory in treaty or customary law. In 
this regard, it is noteworthy that the ICJ has made reference to the “accumulation of effects” 
theory as one of the means to establish whether there was an armed attack,314 but it has not 
expressly relied on it as a conclusive test.315 This makes the Tallinn Manual’s uncritical reliance 
on this theory questionable. It would have been more satisfactory to explain a clear basis for such 
reliance.  
Secondly, Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual and its accompanying commentary do not discuss 
in sufficient detail the issue of the “requisite scale” that is required before a series of individual 
cyber incidents amount to an armed attack justifying resort to a forceful response. There is a real 
possibility that the resulting ambiguity may provide a ground for a State to respond with deadly 
force supposedly in the exercise of its right of self-defence in the event that it is subjected to two 
or more cyber incidents that may not, in fact, be serious or related.  
Thirdly, by enunciating the “accumulation of effects” theory as justification for the use of 
defensive force, Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual does not explain the constitutive element of an 
originator or originators acting in concert. This is surprising given the fact that the commentary 
to Rule 13 identifies this as a “determinative factor” in establishing whether or not a series of 
cyber incidents can be treated as a composite armed attack.  
The nature of cyber operations makes it difficult to determine the identity of the originators 
of a cyber incident. Even less easily discernible is whether one or more originators are working 
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together towards the same objective. Thus, the failure of the Tallinn Manual to provide guidance 
on how to identify concerted cyber action significantly diminishes its practical utility. In 
particular, it makes it difficult for States to determine with certainty what the correct approach is. 
This is a ground for future normative development. 
2.4.3 Cyber Operations not resulting in Adverse Physical Consequences 
Rule 13 of the Tallinn Manual states that the determining factor on whether or not a specific 
cyber operation would constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter is “its scale and effects.”316 The element of effects raises some problematic issues. 
Unlike kinetic operations, cyber operations may not result in the physical consequences (injury, 
death, damage or destruction) that are typically used as indicators of harm in the defensive force 
analysis. The critical legal question is whether a cyber operation that does not result in physical 
consequences, but which causes extensive adverse effects would constitute an armed attack for 
purposes of self-defence.317  
It is regrettable that the above question of such practical importance was left unanswered by 
the International Group of Experts. Some of the Experts took the view that harm to persons or 
physical damage to property is determinative, while others maintained that it is the extent of the 
“ensuing effects” of an attack and not the injurious or destructive nature of the consequences that 
matters.318 It is regrettable that the Tallinn Manual does not comment further on the validity of 
these divergent positions, consequently leaving the issue unsettled. It is the view of the present 
author that, given the nature of cyber operations, the extent of the ensuing effects is the better 
approach. 
The negative effect of the Tallinn Manual’s failure to provide a definitive answer to the 
above question can be illustrated by reference to the cyber incident which entailed a three-week 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Estonia.319 Majority of the DDoS attacks 
targeted government websites, banking data and systems, newspapers, television stations, and 
other targets.320 While this attack caused significant economic disruption and communication 
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breakdown, it did not result in any physical consequences.321 Hence, the absence of clarity as to 
the characterization as “armed attack” of the DDoS attacks against Estonia and whether they can 
give rise to the legitimate use of defensive force is likely to present problems in future cases. 
This demonstrates the practical import of the Tallinn Manual’s dispiriting lack of guidance in the 
above regard. 
2.4.4 Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors 
The commentary to Rule 13 affirms that the cyber actions of non-State actors that can be 
attributed to a State and which meet the requisite scale and effects requirement may constitute an 
armed attack for self-defence purposes.322 With explicit reference to Nicaragua,323 the 
commentary explains that if a single individual or a group of individuals under the direction of 
“State A undertakes cyber operations directed against State B, and the consequence of those 
actions reaches the requisite scale and effects, State A will have committed an armed attack.”324  
While there is little doubt that cyber actions by non-State actors which are clearly attributable 
to a State and which satisfy the scale and effects criteria can amount to an armed attack, the 
opposite is the case in instances where the conduct of the non-State actors is not directed by a 
State.325 The commentary to Rule 13 does not state authoritatively whether acts of non-State 
actors can constitute an armed attack in the absence of State direction.326 It nonetheless outlines 
two competing points of view in this regard. The first point of view, adopted by the majority of 
the Experts, is that cyber action may qualify as armed attack even absent attribution of such 
conduct to a State.327 The second point of view is that State direction and consequent attribution 
of the cyber action of a non-State actor is determinative.328  
Although the commentary to Rule 13 leaves does not take a decisive standpoint, the first 
point of view appears to be consistent with both treaty and customary law.329 The customary 
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norm of self-defence derived from the Caroline case,330 the “inherent” nature of the right of self-
defence articulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter,331 and Security Council Resolutions332 all 
provide support for the view that the right of self-defence can be exercised in response to attacks 
by non-State actors that rise to the level of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. It is however notable that the majority ICJ Wall Opinion took a different view, 
arguing that Article 51 did not apply in the case because the wall was not built by Israel to 
defend against attacks attributable to a foreign State.333 Nonetheless, this aspect of the majority 
opinion was criticized in the Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins334 and Kooijimans.335    
2.5 Necessity and Proportionality 
Rule 14 of the Tallinn Manual provides that a “use of force involving cyber operations 
undertaken by a State in the exercise of its right of self-defence must be necessary and 
proportionate.”336 This rule restates the dual customary criteria for the lawfulness of self-defence 
actions: necessity and proportionality.337 Necessity denotes the requirement that a specific use of 
force is the only effective means of thwarting an imminent attack or defeating one that is already 
underway.338  
An important point concerning necessity that is highlighted in the commentary to Rule 14 is 
that the existence of necessity to resort to forceful means by way of self-defence should be 
judged from the perspective of a victim State, and this determination must be “reasonable in the 
attendant circumstances.”339 This position is particularly relevant in the context of cyber 
operations because it is possible that a State which has been the victim of a cyber armed attack 
may not know that the attacker has desisted from the attacks.340 Thus by preserving the continued 
existence of the right of self-defence, Rule 14 protects a victim State and, importantly, 
discourages unlawful uses of force. However, it is noteworthy that this does not supply a carte 
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blanche right of self-defence; inherent in the concept of necessity is the strict and objective 
limitation of measures taken avowedly in self-defence, thereby “leaving no room for any 
measure of discretion.”341  
Proportionality concerns itself with the quantity of force, including cyber force, by way of 
self-defence that is permissible once the necessity requirement is satisfied.342 The standard of 
proportionality of defensive force is that the scale, scope and duration of force used should not 
be excessive in relation to the aim sought to be achieved, that is, effective repulsion of an armed 
attack or defeating one that is imminent.343 It is noteworthy that the Tallinn Manual adopts a 
flexible approach to the proportionality analysis by recognizing that the amount of force required 
to successfully mount a defence against a cyber armed attack is “context-dependant”.344 
However, it is notable that this view is stated in the commentary without any further elaboration 
specific to the cyber context, thus making it doubtful how the unique aspects of proportionality 
in cyber space should be determined.  
Nonetheless, the commentary to Rule 14 makes a notable statement to the effect that there is 
no requirement that the defensive force be of the same nature as that constituting an armed 
attack.345 This makes clear that a victim State’s right of self-defence in general and the 
proportionality of its response in particular need not be restricted to the original unlawful use of 
force against it. Accordingly, it explains that “a cyber use of force may be resorted to in response 
to a kinetic attack, and vice versa.”346 It further clarifies that while forceful kinetic operations by 
way of self-defence may be permitted, they must be strictly restricted to the objective of 
repelling or defeating an armed cyber attack.347        
2.6 Imminence and Immediacy 
Rule 15 of the Tallinn Manual sets out the temporal parameters for the lawful resort to forceful 
measures, which seeks to supply an answer to the question concerning the precise moment at 
which a cyber armed attack may trigger the right of self-defence. The rule provides that: “The 
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right to use force in self-defence arises if a cyber armed attack occurs or is imminent. It is further 
subject to a requirement of immediacy.”348  
This rule, which is based on Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law as 
expressed in the Caroline test, indicates that a State may resort to self-defence if the necessity of 
that self-defence is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of 
deliberation”.349 It thus permits self-defence in anticipation of a cyber armed attack.350 Rule 15 
also takes into account the view that self-defence applies only in respect of cases where an armed 
attack has already occurred351 or is still incipient.352 Rule 15 therefore fails to reconcile the 
competing views as to the permissibility or prohibition of anticipatory action. Moreover, the 
approach adopted in the Tallinn Manual implicitly reinforces the accepted position that a factual 
determination of imminence must be made in good faith by the relevant State, and on evidentiary 
grounds that are capable of objective assessment.353    
While it is an arguable rule of custom that self-defence action may be resorted to in respect 
of an imminent armed attack, the more difficult question concerns the temporal interpretation of 
the word “imminent” in the context of armed cyber operations.354 Two approaches emerged in 
this regard: a “strict temporal” approach which limits the scope of anticipatory action to 
instances where a cyber armed attack is about to be conducted; and a “last feasible window of 
opportunity” approach which permits self-defence where the victim State will lose its 
opportunity to effectively defend itself when the attack starts unless it acts promptly.355 The 
majority of the Experts supported the later interpretation of imminence, an outcome that 
indicates they took significant account of the unique nature of cyber operations. 
While this view may be criticized as opening the possibility for some States to act unlawfully 
in supposed self-defence, the commentary to Rule 15 elaborates that the “potential victim State 
must first reasonably conclude that the hostility has matured into an actual decision to attack.”356 
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This accords with treaty and customary law in force, but it is less clear how the determination of 
the inference of a decision to attack should be made. This is particularly problematic in the 
context of cyber operations where evidence of conduct is usually surreptitious and hard to 
determine.357  
In recognition of this, Rule 15, as elaborated in its commentary, adopts the position that the 
“lawfulness of any defensive response will be determined by the reasonableness of the victim 
State’s assessment of the situation.”358 This is realistic because it affords a potential victim State 
the opportunity to respond effectively to an armed cyber attack. However, it must be insisted that 
any such determination must be objective, and the standard of objectiveness should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis taking into account all the relevant contextual factors.  
 
PART II   JUS IN BELLO 
3. A CRITIQUE OF JUS IN BELLO RULES IN THE TALLINN MANUAL 
This section examines selected jus in bello Rules of the Tallinn Manual that relate to the 
application of international humanitarian law to cyber operations. It examines: the extent to 
which the rules of international humanitarian law apply to cyber operations; the characterization 
of cyber conflicts; the definition of cyber attack; and doubt as to the status of individuals or 
objects.  
3.1 Applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict 
Rule 20 of the Tallinn Manual affirms the applicability of the law of armed conflict to the cyber 
conduct of belligerents during an armed conflict; it specifically states that “[c]yber operations 
executed in the context of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed conflict.”359 This 
view has been explained by the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Opinion, where it observed that the 
established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts “applies to all 
forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of 
the future.”360 The applicability of the existing norms of the law of armed conflict to cyber 
                                                          
357 Tsagourias (n 62) 36. 
358 Tallinn Manual (n 8) Rule 15, at para 6. 
359 Ibid at 75. 
360 Nuclear Weapons, para 39. 
54 
 
operations conducted in the context of an armed conflict also appears to be supported in State 
practice.  
For instance, during the 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, Israel’s chief information officer 
stated that “[t]he war is taking place on three fronts. The first is physical, the second is on the 
world of social networks and the third is cyber”.361 The practice of the United States also 
supports the view that cyber operations are subject to the current framework of the law of armed 
conflict; the United States Department of Defence has stated that “[i]nternational legal norms, 
such as those found in the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict, which apply to the physical 
domains (i.e. sea, air, land, and space), also apply to the cyberspace domain.”362 
An important point that is captured in the commentary to Rule 20 is that while it is generally 
accepted that the law of armed conflict applies to cyber operations undertaken in the context of 
an armed conflict, the application of this law is contingent on a nexus existing between the cyber 
activity and the armed conflict.363 However, the nature of the requisite nexus was a point of 
contention. There are those Experts who held that nexus can only be established if a cyber 
activity is conducted by a party to an armed conflict (or on its behalf) against its opponent, while 
others held that the cyber activity must have been used to contribute to the originator’s military 
effort.364 The following example is cited in the commentary to Rule 20 to illustrate the different 
viewpoints:    
Consider a cyber operation conducted by State A’s Ministry of Trade against a private 
corporation in enemy State B in order to acquire commercial secrets during an armed conflict. 
According to the first view, the law of armed conflict would govern that operation because it is 
being conducted by a party to the armed conflict against a corporation of the enemy State. Those 
Experts adopting the second view considered that the law of armed conflict does not apply 
because the link between the activity and the hostilities is insufficient.365  
According to the later school of thought (nexus turning on its advancement of a party’s 
military effort), the law of armed conflict would not apply because of an insufficient nexus 
                                                          
361 Roscini (n 4) 8. 
362 US Department of Defense, Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, November 2011, p 9. 
363 Tallinn Manual (n 8) Rule 20, at para 5. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
55 
 
between the cyber activity and the hostilities. Yet the former school of thought found the law of 
armed conflict to apply.366 This illustrates disagreements on fundamental issues of the law of 
armed conflict, which is likely to have implications on the future development of the legal 
regulation of cyber operations.   
The divergence of views as to the existence of a cyber armed conflict and the scope of the 
applicable international humanitarian law points to a fundamental problem: the legal regulation 
of hard-to-define and frequently changing conflicts.367 In this regard, paragraph 9 of the 
commentary to Rule 20 notes that the application of the law of armed conflict to cyber operations 
can prove problematic.368 It further explains that it “is often difficult to identify the existence of a 
cyber operation, its originator, its intended object of attack, and its precise effects.”369 
Importantly, however, it takes the view that these uncertainties of fact do not preclude the 
application of the law of armed conflict.  
This view is substantiated by reliance on the Martens Clause which states that in cases that 
do not appear to be clearly covered by any specific rule of the law of armed conflict, the 
applicable law remains to be derived from “the principles of law of nations, as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of 
public conscience.”370 This clarifies that even when the nature, actors, effects and objects of a 
cyber operation are unclear or altogether unknown, such conduct does not occur in a legal limbo.  
Hence, the Tallinn Manual adopts the convincing position that to the extent that cyber 
activities are conducted in the course of an armed conflict, the Martens Clause, which constitutes 
customary international law, functions to ensures that such activities are not conducted in a legal 
vacuum.371 
3.2 Characterization of Armed Conflict 
The rules regarding the characterization of a cyber armed conflict either as international or non-
international are is set forth in Rules 22 and 23 respectively. Rule 22 stipulates that an 
international armed conflict “exists whenever there are hostilities, which may include or be 
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limited to cyber operations, occurring between two or more States.”372 For its part, Rule 23 
provides that: 
A non-international armed conflict exists whenever there is protracted armed violence, which 
may include or be limited to cyber operations, occurring between governmental armed forces and 
the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups. The confrontation must reach a 
minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum degree 
of organization.373  
A contentious question that arises regarding the characterization of international armed 
conflict is whether such a conflict can arise between a State and a non-State actor which operates 
across international borders. The Experts failed to agree on this issue, thus leaving the question 
unresolved.374 While it is acknowledged that this question has not been conclusively resolved 
even in the practice regarding purely kinetic operations, it was a lost opportunity for the Tallinn 
Manual to advocate a progressive interpretation. 
The characterization as non-international armed conflict of cyber operations also raised sharp 
disagreement with particular regard to the requisite elements of intensity and organization. 
Specifically, the Experts could not agree whether non-destructive cyber operations conducted 
during civil disturbances could tip the scale and raise the violence to the level of armed 
conflict.375      
3.3 Definition of Cyber Attack 
Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual defines a “cyber attack” in the following terms: “a cyber 
operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to 
persons or damage or destruction to objects.”376 The notion of “attack” provides a basis for 
several provisions that constitute the law of armed conflict and is central to the rules of targeting 
and the regulation of means and methods of warfare. Rule 30 is modelled, in large part, after 
Article 49(1) Additional Protocol I which defines “attack” as “acts of violence whether in 
offense or in defence”. However, neither Article 49(1) nor its Commentary describes what the 
notion of “violence” entails. 
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By contrast Rule 30 implicitly elaborates the notion of violence by requiring that the 
consequence of a cyber operation be injury or death to individuals or destruction to objects. 
These criteria are useful when viewed from the perspective of cyber operations. For instance, at 
what point can the destruction of data constitute an attack? The Tallinn Manual takes a purposive 
view that although data constitutes non-physical entities, the threshold of “armed attack” will be 
satisfied when an attack on data results in death of individuals or damage and destruction to 
physical objects.377  
The problem with this interpretation is that it fails to take account of the unique aspects of 
cyber operations; for instance, while a cyber operation that deletes all the social security data of 
adult citizens before an election thereby causing deep anxiety would not amount to an attack, the 
physical destruction of a polling centre would do so. This reveals a fundamental inadequacy of 
Rule 30, which reflects the fact that current international humanitarian law has not systematically 
taken account of the value of digital assets.378     
3.4 Doubt as to Status of Persons and Objects 
Rule 33 of the Tallinn Manual provides that: “In case of doubt as to whether a person is a 
civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.”379 This rule restates the general rule of 
presumption of civilian status in cases of doubt which is codified in Article 50(1) AP I, and 
which reflects customary international law.  
The commentary to Rule 33 provides an instructive discussion on the varying standards for 
determining the threshold at which the presumption of civilian status applies, thus bringing this 
Rule into operation.380 This discussion is particularly useful because it relates to another 
important aspect of the rule on presumption of civilian status: the burden of disproving civilian 
status in cases of doubt. In this regard, the Tallinn Manual convincingly adopts the view that 
since the attacker has a duty to take active precautions it would not be appropriate to shoulder the 
burden of proving that a targeted individual is actually a legitimate target.381 In some cases, the 
defender must take passive precautions such as unambiguously demonstrating that they are 
civilians.   
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The above view taken by the Independent Group of Experts is enunciated in Rule 40 of the 
Tallinn Manual which states that: “In case of doubt as to whether an object that is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, a 
determination that it is so being used may only be made following a careful assessment.”382  
4. SUMMARY OF THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE TALLINN MANUAL 
This section undertakes a critical appraisal of the merits and demerits of the Tallinn Manual with 
a view to highlighting its positive aspects and to suggest improvements where it is lacking. This 
section is important since it summarizes how the International Group of Experts addressed some 
of the contested questions of international law and critiques selected Rules that emerged as a 
result. 
4.1 General Applicability of Current Norms to Cyber Operations 
A notable feature and perhaps the most significant contribution of the Tallinn Manual is its 
emphasis on the fact that international law applies to cyber warfare, an unprecedented domain in 
the modern conduct of hostilities with challenging possibilities. By identifying and outlining 
specific Rules derived from existing international legal norms that apply to cyber warfare, the 
Tallinn Manual underscores the view that international humanitarian law ‘applies to new 
weaponry and to the employment in warfare of new technological developments’.383 
4.2 Specific Applicability of International Humanitarian Law 
The divergence of views regarding the existence of a cyber armed conflict and the scope of the 
applicable international humanitarian law points to a fundamental problem: the legal regulation 
of hard-to-define and frequently changing conflicts. In this regard, paragraph 9 of the 
Commentary to Rule 20 specifically notes that the application of the law of armed conflict to 
cyber operations can prove problematic. It further explains that it ‘is often difficult to identify the 
existence of a cyber operation, its originator, its intended object of attack, and its precise 
effects.’384 Importantly, however, it takes the view that these uncertainties of fact do not preclude 
the application of the law of armed conflict.  
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This view is substantiated by reliance on the Martens Clause which states that in cases that 
do not appear to be clearly covered by any specific rule of the law of armed conflict, the 
applicable law remains to be derived from ‘the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public 
conscience.’385 This clarifies that even when the nature, actors, effects and objects of a cyber 
operation are unclear or altogether unknown, such conduct does not occur in a legal vacuum. 
Accordingly, the Tallinn Manual convincingly adopts the position that to the extent that cyber 
activities are conducted in the course of an armed conflict, the Martens Clause, which constitutes 
customary international law, functions to ensures that such activities are not conducted in a legal 
vacuum.386 
4.3 Cyber Operation not constituting an “Attack” 
The Tallinn Manual provides detailed guidance regarding the legal regulation of cyber operations 
amounting to an “attack” within the meaning of Article 48 of Additional Protocol I. Article 48 
Additional Protocol I restates the customary principle of distinction, stating that parties to a 
conflict “shall direct their operations only against military objectives”. However, the Manual 
provides little guidance and consequently limited protection in instances where the pertinent 
operations do not amount to an attack. In particular, the Manual does not discuss in detail how 
the existing rules of international law, including the customary rule of distinction, protect in 
cases where the effects of cyber operations do not satisfy the minimum threshold of harm, 
requiring injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.387 This is further 
complicated by the commentary to Rule 30 which provides that minimal damage or destruction 
does not meet the threshold of harm required in cyber attack.388 
The position apparently taken in the Tallinn Manual which suggests that the rules of the law 
of armed conflict may not cover cyber incidents not constituting an “attack” is problematic 
because it creates gaps in legal regulation. This runs contrary to the stated mission of the 
International Group of Experts, as expressed by the Project Director of the Tallinn Manual, who 
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explains that the project sought to bring some degree of clarity to complex legal issues on cyber 
operations, including the law of armed conflict.389    
4.4 Sparse Regulation of Low-threshold Cyber Incidents 
The introduction to the Tallinn Manual specifically states that it does not address cyber activities 
that occur below the level of a “use of force” within the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the 
UN Charter. It also does not set out any prohibitions on specific cyber actions falling below the 
“armed conflict” threshold that is necessary for the application of international humanitarian law. 
This indicates that the Tallinn Manual excludes low-threshold actions which are neither 
regulated by the jus ad bellum nor the jus in bello. But it is important to note that the Manual 
does not foreclose the applicability of other international legal standards relative to cyber 
operations.390  
Indeed, the Tallinn Manual is without prejudice to other applicable fields of international 
law, such as international human rights or telecommunication law.391 An illustrative example of 
the extent of the Tallinn Manual’s accommodativeness is its treatment of cyber espionage in the 
context of defining the use of force (Commentary to Rule 11)392 and in the context of armed 
conflict (Rule 66).393 In spite of this, the overall reach of the Tallinn Manual is woefully limited, 
thus giving little operational guidance in cases where cyber activities are employed but it is 
unclear whether the threshold of applicability of jus in bello or jus ad bellum has been attained.   
4.5 Critical Legal Issues not Sufficiently Addressed 
An objective examination of the Tallinn Manual reveals that certain critical legal issues are either 
insufficiently addressed or ignored altogether. While the Manual deals with some important 
issues providing welcome clarity, it would be difficult for any satisfactory critique to fail to show 
some of its notable weaknesses. In the following sub-sections, selected legal issues of critical 
importance will be highlighted. 
4.5.1 Jurisdictional Bases in Cyberspace 
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Part 1 of the Tallinn Manual, entitled “International cyber security law”, indicates that its aim is 
to provide operational clarity as regards those aspects of international law that are pertinent to 
the “hostile use of cyberspace, but are not formally an aspect of the jus in bello.”394 Having 
expressly excluded the jus in bello, the Manual specifies that its primary focus is on aspects of 
jus ad bellum, including jurisdiction. A crucial point to note is that the drafters of the Manual 
explicitly rejected the view that owing to its relative novelty, “international law is silent on 
cyberspace in the sense that it is a new domain subject”.395 Instead, unanimity was achieved in 
support of the contrary view.396  
The rule of the Tallinn Manual which specifically addresses the jus ad bellum aspect of 
sovereignty is consistent with the view that the general principles of international law are not 
excluded from the regulation of cyberspace. In particular, Rule 2 states that: 
Without prejudice to applicable international obligations, a State may exercise its jurisdictions: 
(a) over persons engaged in cyber activities on its territories; 
(b) over cyber infrastructure located on its territory; and 
(c) extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.397    
Paragraph 1 of the commentary to Rule 2 confirms that the jurisdictional authority to prescribe, 
enforce and adjudicate extends to all matters, including those of a “civil, criminal or 
administrative” nature.398 The commentary further explains that all the jurisdictional bases that 
are recognized in international law apply in a more or less similar manner to cyberspace, albeit 
with appropriate restrictions.399  
However, the specific issues regarding the application of the internationally recognized 
jurisdictional bases authorizing lawful State action are not discussed in any satisfactory detail.400 
This leaves room for significant doubt concerning important legal issues that have practical 
significance in concrete operations. For instance, a reading of Rule 2 of the Tallinn Manual does 
not make clear: i) whether this Rule applies to objects owned by a State and used specifically for 
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commercial purposes;401 ii) precisely how a State may exercise jurisdiction over persons or 
objects that are, at the relevant time, properly within the jurisdiction of two or more States;402 
and iii) the basis on which civilians or non-State entities not clearly affiliated to a State but 
apparently performing State functions are subject to the relevant State’s jurisdiction.403  
Another weakness is the fact that despite the affirmation of the Tallinn Manual’s drafters that 
the general principles of international law apply in cyberspace, an examination of Rules 2 – 4 
does not sufficiently explain whether the content of the Rules set forth “evidences a general 
principle of public international law”.404        
4.5.2 Limits to Security Council Action 
Section 3 of Chapter 2 (The use of force) of the Tallinn Manual, entitled “Actions of 
international governmental organizations”, discusses the role of both international and regional 
organizations in discharging their respective mandates when dealing with threats to international 
peace.405 The organizations referred to in Section 3 (Rules 18 and 19) are those that are 
established under the UN Charter. Specifically, while the collective security mandate of the UN 
Security Council has its legal basis in Article 39 UN Charter, that of regional organizations is 
founded on Article 52(1) UN Charter which empowers the respective regional entities to develop 
systems of collective security that are “appropriate for regional action”.406 
Rule 18 contemplates the resort, in the first instance, to non-forceful cyber operations in 
response to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression within the meaning 
of Article 39 UN Charter. Also, it contemplates the authorization of forceful cyber operations if 
non-forceful measures are not effective.407 For its part, Rule 19 recognizes the capacity of 
regional organizations to “conduct enforcement actions, involving or in response to cyber 
operations, pursuant to a mandate from, or authorization by, the United Nations Security 
Council.”408 What is most commendable about these rules is that they are well-anchored on 
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primary sources of international law,409 namely statutory provisions, resolutions of international 
410 and (inter)national jurisprudence.411 
4.5.3 Possible limits on UN Security Council enforcement action 
Rule 18 of the Tallinn Manual sets out the scope of the UN Security Council’s powers deriving 
from its enforcement mandate established under Articles 39, 41 and 42 UN Charter. More 
specifically, Rule 18 sets out the extent to which the UN Security Council may deal with 
escalating and new threats.412 While it is welcome that Rule 18 adapts the provisions of Article 
39 UN Charter to the novel situations that may arise with regard to cyber operations, a notable 
defect of this Rule is the fact that it does not explain important aspects of the scope of the 
Security Council’s enforcement mandate in sufficient detail. For instance, the commentary to 
Rule 18 concedes that: “It is uncertain whether other rules of international law limit the authority 
of the Security Council to authorize or mandate action.”413 
The illustration used in connection with the above view poses the critical legal question as to 
whether a specific Security Council authorization to conduct cyber attacks against civilians 
would override a related prohibition. However, it fails to answer this question. Hence, it does not 
provide any meaningful guidance on how to proceed in the event that there is a conflict of legal 
obligations. It, however, states that in any event the Security Council’s decision to resolving this 
problem and consequently violate “rules of international law” exercise its enforcement mandate 
“should not be taken lightly”.414 It also states categorically that under no circumstances may the 
Security Council deviate from rules of a jus cogens nature.”415 
The main problem is that the solution offered by the Tallinn Manual to the critical legal issue 
of a conflict of legal obligations and the view it adopts regarding the supposed primacy of jus 
cogens norms vis-à-vis the Security Council’s powers does not provide an objective analysis of 
relevant authorities and evidence in support of its position. Instead, paragraph 8 of the 
commentary to Rule 18 uncritically adopts a rigid view, while there exists authority and evidence 
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to suggest the contrary.416 For instance, the position adopted above makes it unclear how other 
customary international obligations upon the Security Council may be reconciled with jus cogens 
norms in the context of cyber operations.          
4.6 Geographical and Institutional Bias 
The Tallinn Manual had the institutional backing of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence. Thus, it is understandable and indeed is to be expected that the majority of 
the legal experts involved in the writing of the Manual would be drawn from NATO States. An 
examination of the list of the International Group of Experts and Participants and their respective 
affiliations confirms this geographical and institutional bias;417 it constitutes individuals who are 
legal experts from predominantly Western European, North American and Australasian 
backgrounds.418 On the face of it this smacks of Western political and strategic positioning, a fact 
that is likely to impact negatively on the legitimacy of the Manual.419  
Even more surprising is the fact that Estonia, a one-time victim of cyber operations and the 
host State in which the Tallinn Manual was drafted and adopted, only had one legal expert 
representing its interests.  This fact adds more force to the criticism that the Tallinn Manual is 
under-representative and therefore should not be taken as a conclusive representation of 
international law applicable to cyber warfare. Hence, the legitimacy of the Tallinn Manual can 
easily be called to question by other non-participating but militarily significant States such as 
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, which are incidentally key players in the field of cyber 
warfare. 
However, the fact that the Tallinn Manual is not the product of broader geographical and 
institutional consultation does not necessarily preclude its usefulness in its entirety. The Tallinn 
Manual does not purport to be an exercise in treaty law-making. Instead, it clearly states that its 
content is only meant to identify and restate current international law and to clarify how such law 
applies in relation to the unique aspects of cyber warfare.420 Therefore, the content of the Tallinn 
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Manual may arguably be considered objective despite the participation of some of other states 
with particular interest and experience in the question of cyber warfare such as China, Russia and 
North Korea. 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The Tallinn Manual identifies and explains the rules and principles of international law 
applicable to cyber operations, but it is not comprehensive. Indeed, it has some gaps in legal 
regulation and should be considered a work in progress. Nonetheless, a critically important 
contribution of the Tallinn Manual is its emphasis that current international legal norms apply to 
cyber operations, thereby demonstrating that existing international law is not “silent on new 
technological developments.”421 This will no doubt lend support to the view that despite the little 
definitive guidance on the subject of legal regulation of cyber operations, States are not 
consequently relieved of their obligation to comply with applicable international law.422 
The review in this chapter has revealed a number of merits as well as a few weaknesses of 
the Tallinn Manual. However, the flaws of the Manual detract little from the general value and 
importance of the Tallinn Manual. In particular, the Manual provides a fairly detailed, well-
researched and clearly presented guideline on the operational rules that are applicable in cyber 
warfare. This is further complemented by the accessible writing style which makes clarity and 
accessibility of its presentation. 
The most important point to note is that the Tallinn Manual had the challenging task of 
introducing clarity to the legal rules that ought to govern the relatively new domain of cyber 
operations with all its complexities and uncertainties. Insofar as the Manual prudently admits to 
its limitations, it is critical to note that it is a crucial first step in the progressive process of 
developing the international legal framework that should regulate cyber operations. That this 
chapter has highlighted selected legal gaps in regulation, limited protection in certain instances 
and some notable absence of clarity regarding some issues provides support for the fact there is 
indeed a need for continued work towards developing comprehensive rules on the international 
law applicable to cyber operations. This is the task that the next chapter will seek to address. 
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Chapter IV 
THE TALLINN MANUAL AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL REGULATION OF CYBER 
OPERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally recognized that existing international law applies to cyber operations. What is less 
clear, however, is how certain unique aspects of cyberspace can fit into the current framework of 
international law. While the current framework is applicable in principle, there may be some 
daunting challenges regarding its practical application. For example, it has been observed that 
“the use of computer technology to wage war necessitates a re-evaluation of the definition of the 
term ‘weapon’.”423 Another point that illustrates the insufficiency of the existing framework is 
the special role played by non-State actors in cyberspace operations. Typically, when faced with 
threats, including cyber threats, from non-State actors there is a tendency on the part of States to 
respond in ways that overstep legal boundaries.424 This highlights the need for cyber-specific 
norms to constrain State conduct within the limits of long-established rules of international law. 
This Chapter focuses on the special role that non-binding instruments can play in the 
emergence of binding norms to govern new and emerging contexts. In particular, it undertakes a 
comparative analysis of the Tallinn Manual and other non-binding instruments of international 
law. The primary object of this process is to suggest, with reference to the experience of earlier 
instruments, how best binding cyber-specific norms can be developed.  
 2. NON-CONVENTIONAL SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) outlines the sources of international 
law.425 In particular, Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute provides that: 
‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
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b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d) subject to provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law’. 
Of particular interest to this section are two non-conventional sources of international law:  
custom and general principles of law.426 The text of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute makes clear 
that custom and general principles of law are equivalent to international conventions.427 But 
unlike conventional law which derives its legal force from the consent of the parties thereto, 
customary norms and general principles of law draw their binding force from extensive and 
uniform practice.428 More specifically, 
‘Given the rudimentary character of international law, and the lack of both a central law-making 
body and a central judicial institution endowed with compulsory jurisdiction, in practice many 
decisions of the most authoritative courts (and in particular the ICJ) are bound to have crucial 
importance in establishing the existence of customary rules’.429    
It is noteworthy that domestic judicial interpretations of the content of judgments issued by 
international courts also constitute important indicators of the recognition of certain rules as an 
emanation of a general principle of law.430 
Non-binding instruments may also qualify as sources of international law. These instruments 
may include, among others, declarations, codes of conduct, manuals drafted by independent 
experts, and reports by non-governmental organizations. The utility of such instruments lies in 
the fact that they elaborate general rules and express general expectations of the conduct of 
States. But the normative value of such instruments may be erroneously discounted on the basis 
that Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute does not explicitly recognize them as sources of international 
law. 
Although non-binding instruments are not listed as sources of law in Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute, they nevertheless articulate established norms and are often drafted with a view to 
respond effectively to contemporary developments. Hence, these instruments can be taken as 
evidence of “subsequent practice” under Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT when interpreting a 
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particular binding treaty norm. Consequently, they may be relied upon when interpreting existing 
treaties. Non-binding instruments may also provide an instructive indicator as to the attitudes of 
certain States regarding particular conduct by looking, for instance, at relevant State participation 
in the adoption of that instrument. This is particularly pertinent in the case of instruments 
adopted by consensus and adopted by governments. 
A more distinct role of non-binding instruments that will be the focus of this Chapter is their 
special role as a means to build consensus as to the acceptance of certain norms before their 
eventual transformation into binding norms.431 Recent developments in international law point 
towards the increasing utility of non-binding instruments as a critical precursor to the emergence 
of binding norms. The following section will briefly examine this trend with a view to suggesting 
the way forward in developing binding norms to govern State conduct in cyberspace.          
3. NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS 
International law is primarily made, applied and enforced by States, and its binding force derives 
from the fact of consent among contracting parties to international treaties to be bound by the 
rules set forth therein.432 But the process of codifying such rules in the form of treaties is long 
and often encumbered by politics.433 This poses considerable challenges when seeking to codify 
timely international rules to govern emergent fields that are sparsely regulated by existing 
international law. With particular regard to the area of international humanitarian law, this reality 
has seen the emergence of pragmatic alternatives to the State-centric process of international 
legislation. 
3.1 Emerging Trends in the Adoption of Non-Binding Instruments 
A notable feature of the past twenty years in the legislative history of international humanitarian 
law has been the growing role of non-State, expert-driven initiatives to clarify the international 
law applicable to under-codified forms of warfare. In contrast to the State-centric process of 
international law-making which produces binding rules, the alternative non-State process entails 
the production by international groups of experts of non-binding instruments. These instruments 
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are subsequently adopted under the auspices of non-governmental forums, and some of them are 
eventually incorporated into the military manuals of States.  
Examples of non-binding instruments dealing with specific aspects of international law 
applicable to different types of warfare include: (i) the San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea434 (Naval Warfare Manual) adopted by the International 
Humanitarian Law Institute; (ii) the San Remo Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict435 (Non-International Armed Conflict Manual) adopted by the International 
Humanitarian Law Institute; and (iii) the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare436 (Air and Missile Warfare Manual) adopted by the Harvard Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research.  
3.2 Common Aspects of Non-Binding Instruments 
The similarities between these manuals are readily apparent; not only are they all non-binding 
instruments adopted under the auspices of non-governmental entities, but they are also the 
product of an expert-driven process whereby legal experts comprising scholars and practitioners 
set forth the applicable law. Another important similarity, which is also reflected in the Tallinn 
Manual, is that the legal experts participated in the drafting process and endorsed its final 
outcome not in their official or institutional capacities, but as independent experts acting solely 
in their personal capacity. 
3.3 The Naval Warfare Manual and the Tallinn Manual Compared  
The Naval Warfare Manual provides instructive insight when compared with the Tallinn Manual 
because it was adopted earlier than the other instruments and also because it has been more 
widely accepted. This Manual shares certain significant similarities with the Tallinn Manual. 
First, the title of the Tallinn Manual derives its inspiration from the Naval Warfare Manual; both 
of them set out as the aim of the respective documents the elaboration of the rules of 
international law applicable to specific subject-matter. Secondly, both the Tallinn Manual and 
the Naval Warfare Manual were prepared by a group of experts, acting in their personal 
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capacities, who have recognized expertise and deep knowledge of the relevant subject-matter. 
Moreover, both the final texts of the Tallinn Manual and the Naval Warfare Manual were 
adopted under the auspices of institutions, namely the NATO CCD-COE and the San Remo 
Institute for International Law. 
As regards the substantive content of the Naval Warfare Manual and the Tallinn Manual, 
both Manuals set out specific rules and also provide a useful elaborations and explanations. The 
Naval Warfare Manual refers to this as the “Explanation” while the Tallinn Manual employs the 
term “Commentary”, but both terms denote one and the same thing. This serves the purpose of 
setting forth the basis of the particular rule in treaty and customary international law, and it also 
explains the manner in which the drafters interpreted the applicable norms in the respective 
contexts.  
4. BETWEEN A CONVENTION AND A NON-BINDING INSTRUMENT 
4.1 Sources of International Law Recalled 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute outlines three main sources of international law, namely 
conventions, custom, and general principles of law. The text of this provision contains nothing to 
suggest that there is any hierarchy between the above sources of law, or that any one of them is 
less important than the other. Hence, it can be stated that custom and general principles of law 
are equal, in normative terms, to conventions insofar as their status as sources of international 
law is concerned. An important difference, however, lies in the fact that conventions are based 
on the consent of States, as contracting parties to international agreements, to accept certain 
duties and to recognize certain entitlements arising from that agreement. Accordingly, a rule of 
treaty law takes effect after the terms of convention have been agreed to by the parties, and this 
can occur immediately. 
By contrast, customary law evolves through the general and consistent practice of States 
coupled with the belief that the practice is based on a legal obligation. But this does not exclude 
that a rule of customary law can develop quickly, even spontaneously, in response to a new 
situation.437 Another difference between customary law and treaty law is that the former evolves 
through the recognition that the observance of a particular rule is required by law. Rules of treaty 
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law, on the other hand, are developed to cover both specific rules and more general provisions 
that regulate the relevant conduct, and they draw their binding force from the contractual 
undertaking of the parties thereto. 
General principles of law evolve by means of the recognition as an emanation of a general 
principle of law of certain general maxims of law. Accordingly, it differs from the development 
of rules of custom which focus on particular rules. Moreover, unlike the rules of custom which 
are premised on the practice of States and international bodies, these general principles of law 
are drawn primarily from the extensive recognition of the relevant rules in domestic law and 
jurisprudence. It is thus from national forums that general principles of law derive their binding 
force. 
Apart from custom and general principles of law, certain non-binding instruments of 
international law may be useful in the development of legal norms. Although, as has been stated 
above,438 these non-binding instruments are not enumerated as formal sources of international 
law in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, it is possible to find a legal basis for their reliance.439 The 
following sections explore certain non-binding instruments that have been important in the 
advancement of international law and in the articulation of subsequent practice of States. The 
examination of these instruments and the extent of the eventual adoption of their norms will 
provide key insights regarding the future of legal regulation of cyber operations.            
4.2 The Progressive Codification of Minimum Humanitarian Norms 
The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards440 was adopted in 1990 in response 
to the inadequacy of existing norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law in 
cases of internal crisis.441 The Turku Declaration was drafted by a group of experts under the 
auspices of the Institute for Human Rights at Åbo Akademi University in Turku, Finland. The 
Turku Declaration outlined 18 Articles setting forth minimum humanitarian guarantees that 
should apply at all times, in all circumstances and to all actors in situations of violence. 
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Despite the important contribution of the Turku Declaration, its legal effect was not 
significant, ostensibly because of its unofficial and non-binding nature.442 Thus in 1991, in a bid 
to give it official and binding status, the Declaration was presented to the UN for examination 
and possible adoption. This was an initial step towards codifying the minimum humanitarian 
norms outlined in the Declaration. In 1994 the Declaration was transmitted to the Commission 
on Human Rights for detailed analysis and revision with a view to adopting the revised version 
as a UN document. Subsequently, the Declaration was shelved by the Commission which opted 
instead to initiate formal negotiations on a proposed convention on minimum humanitarian 
norms to be adopted under the aegis of the UN. 
The Commission therefore requested governments, intergovernmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations to provide their views on the norms set forth in the Turku 
Declaration. In 1996 a meeting was subsequently held in Cape Town, where the participants 
discussed the Declaration and presented their suggestions for improvement to the Commission. 
In 1997 the Commission requested the Secretary-General of the UN, in conjunction with the 
ICRC, to prepare an analytical report of minimum humanitarian standards that would form the 
basis of consultations with States and non-State entities. 
The resulting consultations saw the submission of several comments, observations and 
analytical reports for consideration. However, the current status of a future treaty on minimum 
humanitarian norms can best be described as dormant. In fact, it has even been observed that the 
Turku Declaration “seems to have reached an impasse, with no apparent movement being made 
on progressing the document to the stage of an official declaration.”443 Therefore, in terms of 
advancing norms that can bind the conduct of State and non-State actors, the performance of the 
codification approach has been dismal.  
4.3 The Successful Evolution of Norms regarding Armed Conflict at Sea 
The Naval Warfare Manual, a non-binding instrument that was adopted in June 1994 by a group 
of experts, sought to update the international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. This 
Manual is a good example of a success story in terms of developing new norms of international 
law. The Naval Warfare Manual, like the Turku Declaration, was the product of a long-term 
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expert-driven project. But it differs from the Declaration in an important respect; it was never 
transmitted to the UN treaty-making system and thus could not claim any official status. 
And yet, currently the Naval Warfare Manual is generally regarded as “the most 
comprehensive … enunciation of the international law applicable at sea.”444 The rules set out in 
the Manual have been adopted in the national military manuals of several States, and they are 
considered to be an accurate restatement of customary norms applicable to naval warfare.445 
Examples of nations that have incorporated the content of the Naval Warfare Manual into their 
military manuals include Germany,446 Canada,447 the United Kingdom,448 and the United 
States.449 
A crucial aspect of the approach taken by the drafters of the Naval Warfare Manual that may 
have been the key to its comparative success in the evolution of international norms on armed 
conflict at sea is the decision to keep it as a non-binding instrument.450 Doswald-Beck, the editor 
of the Manual, explains the key rationale behind that decision: 
‘In view of uncertainty in the law, the participants decided that it was premature to think in terms 
of a draft treaty, and that a type of successor to the Oxford Manual of 1913 would be more 
appropriate and should in itself promote comprehension of contemporary law’.451 
4.4 Comparative Observations 
The evolution of new norms to govern the conduct of armed conflict at sea by way of an 
independent, expert-driven process is certainly admirable. But what is more remarkable is the 
fact that binding norms have since developed as evidenced by State practice, which has been 
uniform and representative. The success of the Naval Warfare Manual in this regard contrasts 
sharply with the convoluted and ultimately unproductive road taken by the UN process towards 
the codification of minimum humanitarian norms in the form of an international convention. 
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Indeed, while the UN treaty-making process has taken more than twenty years with little to show 
in terms of norm advancement, the rules set forth in the Naval Warfare Manual only took seven 
years to be adopted in a national military manual. Moreover, unlike the UN treaty-making 
process, the drafting of the Naval Warfare Manual was more systematic and efficient.      
The fact that the non-binding rules set forth in the Naval Warfare Manual have since been 
adopted in the operational manuals of some militarily significant States further reinforces its 
legal effect, demonstrating the potential of non-binding instruments.452 Therefore, the 
comparative success of the Naval Warfare Manual (an expert-driven, non-binding instrument 
that was not submitted to the UN) shows that the eventual evolution of norms is not determined 
by whether or not they derive from the UN machinery, but by the actual practice of States. 
In light of the above, the adoption of the Tallinn Manual should be seen as a first step in the 
process of developing cyber-specific norms. However, it must be emphasized that it is crucial for 
States and other subjects of international law, such as international organizations, to express their 
acceptance of these norms in order for them to acquire binding force. Cyber-specific norms 
should therefore be allowed to develop over time so as to sediment into either rules of customary 
law or to be recognized as an emanation of general principles of law.  
A promising suggestion for the development of cyber-specific norms is the requirement of 
justification for every course of action at the operational level.453 Legal writers have argued that 
new norms may evolve through the implementation of processes requiring commanders and 
other superiors to consider the legal implications of a cyber operation.454 Once the parameters of 
the respective rights, responsibilities and remedies of various international actors is sufficiently 
clarified by practice, then the ultimate objective of codification in the form of a treaty can be 
meaningfully pursued. 
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5. LEGAL AND POLICY CRITIQUES OF A PROPOSED CONVENTION 
There is general consensus that the use of cyber operations in international relations are subject 
to the constraints of international law.455 Moreover, there is general agreement that certain norms 
that are cyber-specific should be identified in order to effectively regulate certain aspects that are 
unique to cyber operations.456 However, there is little guidance on how, when, and the extent to 
which these operations are subject to existing norms.457 The question of the appropriate method 
to resolve the insufficient legal regulation of cyber operations is contentious; there are two 
schools of thought.  
First, there are those who advocate the adoption of a convention to govern the rights, duties, 
and remedies related to the conduct of cyber operations.458 Secondly, there are those who reject 
the utility or viability of a convention, arguing instead for the need to allow cyber-specific norms 
to develop and be shaped via practice, ultimately leading to codification.459 Both of these 
standpoints have some merit and thus deserve to be objectively examined in order to determine 
the best way forward as regards the future legal regulation of cyber operations.  
5.1 Conventional Limitation of Not-yet-Known Capabilities 
The introduction of cyber operations into the arena of war-fighting is still a relatively novel 
phenomenon.460 Consequently, its disruptive and destructive capacity has yet to be fully 
understood because operational practice is sparse, a view that has been acknowledged by some 
legal writers:  
‘Visible or readily discernible state practice is still scarce. The military potential of computer 
network attacks is now only starting to be fully explored, and it is difficult to assess how realistic 
                                                          
455 ET Jensen, ‘Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-
Defense’ (2002) 38 Stanford Journal of International Law 207; RD Scott, ‘Legal Aspects of Information Warfare: 
Military Disruption of Telecommunications’ (1998) 45 Naval Law Review 57, 59. 
456 Department of Defense, Office of General Council, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information 
Operations (1999) 11: “There are novel features of information warfare that will require expansion and 
interpretation of established principles of the law of war.” 
457 See K Dörmann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 19 May 2001, para 29. 
458 DB Hollis, ‘Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations’ (2007) 11 Lewis and Clarke Law 
Review 1023; AJ Schaap, ‘Cyberwarfare Operations: Development and Use under International Law’ (2009) 64 Air 
Force Law Review 121. 
459 Kelsey (n 453) 1450. 
460 Roscini (n 4) 41. 
76 
 
or likely the theoretical worst-case scenarios that are contemplated in the literature—e.g. the 
manipulation of a nuclear power plant via cyberspace—really are’.461 
Given the limited information relating to the military utility of cyber operations, it would seem 
unwise to seek to restrict the ability to use potentially advantageous cyber capabilities by means 
of an international convention.462 This view finds support in the historical reluctance with which 
certain States accepted the restrictions of nuclear non-proliferation treaties. The unlikelihood of 
States yielding to the strictures of treaty law is also supported by the unique character of cyber 
operations which allows States to “defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and 
distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian 
and military … legal and illegal.”463    
But on the other hand, some States may find it expedient to accept the restrictions imposed 
by a multilateral convention on cyber warfare.464 This is particularly true for developed nations 
such as the United States which possesses the strongest cyber warfare capabilities and at the 
same time is predisposed to a high level of vulnerability to cyber attack due to its significantly 
heavy reliance on technology.465 One legal writer explains the rationale for this: “when 
operational vulnerabilities outweigh the expected technical advantage, it would be more prudent 
to advocate an outright ban or strict controls on the cyber weapons.”466 
However convincing the above proportionality rationale may be, its persuasive effect pales in 
comparison to the unique attributes of cyber capabilities and their operational significance.467 An 
economy of force analysis coupled with the notorious anonymity of cyber operations will 
recommend such operations to States for two reasons. First, it will afford States the opportunity 
to expend the least possible time, casualties, and material resources. Secondly, it will shield the 
State from taking responsibility for its acts because of the difficulty in attributing the offending 
conduct to the concerned State.468 These are powerful incentives for States not to accept any 
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form of limitation of the use of cyber weapons by means of treaty law because that would 
foreclose vital military advantage. But there is also the possibility that States may negotiate a 
weak treaty, sign it then subsequently ignore it. 
Even assuming that some States may welcome the restriction of State cyber conduct by 
means of treaty law, the prospect of regulating a phenomenon whose capacity to kill, injure or 
destroy is not yet fully known will be problematic. Indeed, it is unlikely that a law can 
sufficiently address practical aspects of a new and developing form of warfare that has rarely 
been deployed and whose possible effects have not been fully understood. In light of the 
numerous and under-explored capabilities of cyber weapons it is doubtful whether States would 
agree to limit, by means of an international convention, “the use of a new weapon when so little 
is known about its full capabilities.”469       
Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that the adoption of an international convention on cyber 
warfare should not be considered an exercise in futility. But while it cannot be categorically 
excluded that the conclusion of an international treaty on cyber warfare may improve its 
effective legal regulation,470 absent any indication that the cyber rights and responsibilities of 
various concerned subjects of international law have been fully understood such a move would 
certainly be premature. 
5.2 Asymmetry Concerns 
A related concern that is likely to impede efforts to conclude a meaningful convention to govern 
cyber operations under international law is the relative asymmetry between the capabilities and 
vulnerabilities of individual nations.471 This can be illustrated by taking two hypothetical States, 
A and B, and considering their asymmetrical positioning. State A has preeminent cyber 
capabilities and its well-developed economy is highly dependent on information technologies. 
For its part, State B is less developed but highly militarized and has acquired significant cyber 
warfare capabilities. Consider then a scenario where the two nations are involved in a dispute in 
which recourse is made to cyber operations.  
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State B conducts a cyber operation targeting the commercial capital of State A, shutting 
down its power grid, disrupting all aerial and railway communications, and in the process 
causing death, injury and destruction of property. This would be disastrous for State A since its 
highly networked and technology-dependent economy is at the same time its most dangerous 
vulnerability.472 However, if State A conducts a similar operation against State B, its net effect 
would be comparatively insignificant.  
In light of the above, the critical issue to be considered is whether State B is likely to bind 
itself to a treaty that bans or restricts the use of cyber warfare capabilities. The answer to this is, 
in all probability, negative because the absence of any treaty prohibition of cyber weapons offers 
State B strategic military advantage by availing a tool that “cannot similarly be effectively 
deployed against it.”473 This rationale also finds support in the fact that less developed States will 
not willingly foreclose “an opportunity to achieve a measure of parity with wealthy states 
through the development of cyber weapons.”474 Indeed, cyber technologies are relatively cheap 
and easy to acquire, thereby allowing weaker States and non-State actors to “potentially cause 
considerable damage to countries with superior conventional military power.”475 This is an 
advantage that will very unlikely be given up by many nations.476 
It may well be in the strategic interest of some nations to agree to treaty norms which restrict 
the range of permissible cyber conduct that they can engage in. This will entail the acceptance of 
norms prescribing that certain conduct is prohibited, with the consequence of attaching State 
responsibility. Yet State engagement in some prohibited cyber conduct may actually be 
beneficial. Indeed, it has been observed that “some prohibited uses of cyber weapons offer states 
the possibility of dealing blows to an enemy with a low cost in human life and possibly little 
physical damage to civilian objects.”477 
5.3 False and Fallible Analogies 
The relative novelty of military operations conducted in cyberspace and the absence of specific 
provisions to guide this phenomenon invariably leads those seeking to identify applicable rules 
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to draw analogies from the existing law.478 Cyber operations challenge these analogies 
fundamentally.479 When existing rules and principles are sought to be extended to new contexts 
little account is often taken of the uniqueness of the new scenario. The resulting rules will thus 
prove to be too general.480 In the case of cyberspace, many of the traditional international law 
concepts that were developed to regulate the physical domain may not offer the most insightful 
of analogies.    
Consider the case of cyber operations and the concepts of territorial sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. It is undeniable that these concepts certainly extend to the cyber realm, but what is 
less clear is whether an attempt to identify cyber-specific rules by way of analogy will be 
productive.481 Unlike the physical domain of war-fighting, cyberspace consists of a physical and 
a non-physical element.482 The physical element of cyberspace denotes the “physical 
infrastructure through which the data travel wired or wireless, including servers, routers, 
satellites, cables, wires, and the computers, while the [non-physical element] includes the 
protocols that allow data to be routed and understood, as well as the software used and the 
data.”483  
In light of the sophisticated inter-connectivity of cyberspace, analogy with the notion of 
territory is bound to be problematic. Although the effects-based identification of a target State is 
fairly uncontroversial,484 the difficulty lies in ascertaining the origin of the attack.485 The 
structure of the internet impedes detection and attribution, thus making certain analogies with the 
physical domain unconvincing. Lessons from actual cyber incidents indicate that some analogies 
can be inaccurate at best and misleading at worst: “[c]overing one’s fingerprints and footprints 
online is relatively simple, compared to getting rid of physical evidence. IP addresses can be 
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spoofed, an attack that appears to come from one place, may actually originate somewhere 
else.”486        
Attempts to draw general analogies between kinetic warfare and cyber warfare with a view to 
deriving binding norms is also likely to be hampered by the fact that different interests dictate 
varying approaches. For instance, there is likely to be sharp difference of opinion over the proper 
classification of cyber conduct as ordinary crime or violations of the jus ad bellum and the jus in 
bello. The consequences of categorizing cyber attacks as violations of the latter are so severe 
compared to criminal law violations “that an impasse in selecting the appropriate choice of laws 
could derail the entire negotiation.”487 Further dispute will likely arise between nations that will 
seek to avoid classification of certain conduct as hostile acts rendering them targetable and 
nations that may not be opposed to treaty regulation, in principle, but which may “wish to 
reserve the ability to address cyber attacks with a military response.”488   
5.4 Attribution and Inconclusive Evidentiary Standards 
The fundamental challenge posed by attribution to the effective operation of the rules of 
international law has been acknowledged by the ICJ in its Nicaragua Judgment, where the 
problem was identified as being not in the legal process of imputing the conduct to a particular 
State, but rather in “the prior process of tracing material proof of the identity of the 
perpetrator”.489 The problem of attribution becomes all the more apparent in cyber operations, 
where identifying the author of a particular attack is impeded by significant technical 
problems.490  
More specifically, authors of cyber attacks can conduct surreptitious operations and 
effectively deploy their expertise to dissimulate their identities and avoid detection.491 A good 
example that illustrates the challenge of identifying the perpetrator or origin of a cyber attack is 
the Stuxnet incident, where Iranian nuclear centrifuges were targeted.492 Studies by several cyber 
security experts have not definitively pinpointed the nation responsible for the attack or even 
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identified the target. This indicates that the element of identification presents a technical 
challenge in the cyber context, but it does not suggest that it is impossible to identify authors of 
hostile cyber actions.493  
Rather, the technical difficulty of identifying cyber attackers in cyberspace, like the case in 
other comparable scenarios, reflects the challenge of extending existing rules to new contexts.494 
It therefore reinforces the view that rather than codifying contentious and untested cyber-specific 
norms, it would be more productive to analyze developments in computer technology and the 
practice of States as derived from national internet regulation.495 This will inform the specific 
norms relative to the relevant material proof that should be used in the identification of 
perpetrators of cyber attacks.496 Moreover, meaningful norms can only evolve by reference to 
practice as opposed to stipulation in treaty form because the relevant tools for easier 
identification are still being developed.497 
The technical problem of identifying cyber attackers and attributing responsibility cannot in 
itself satisfactorily explain the preference for the progressive evolution of cyber-specific norms 
through practice over their immediate stipulation in treaty form.498 But the legal problem of 
specifying the attribution criteria and its corresponding standard of evidence certainly can.499 
More specifically, there is much disagreement over the requisite level of State control for 
responsibility to attach and the prosecutorial burden of proof.500 At present, it has not been 
settled whether the appropriate level of State control is that of overall control or effective 
control.501 Similarly, it remains unclear whether culpability should be proved beyond any 
reasonable doubt or beyond any doubt.502  
The Tallinn Manual does not take a clear position as regards the contentious issues 
surrounding attribution and the correlative burden of proof.503 Although regrettable, this decision 
is understandable since the Tallinn Manual was not intended to stipulate any hard and fast rules 
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in this regard, but only to outline generally accepted principles of law and to “capture all 
reasonable positions” in its commentary.504                 
5.5 Problematic Enforcement 
The efficacy of any ban or conditional restriction imposed by international treaties on the use of 
certain weapons turns significantly on enforcement. As has been stated (5.4), the attribution of 
cyber operations to a State poses fundamental challenges to effective enforcement.505 First, the 
unique nature of cyber warfare means that it requires a different approach and special expertise 
in order to understand fully the contours of the rights, responsibilities, and remedies involved.506 
Secondly, it is not easy to ascertain whether, in fact, an international wrongful act has been 
committed when cyber operations are resorted to.507 Even where it is possible to find a violation 
of international law, an additional challenge remains: the problem of attribution. The inherent 
interconnectivity of the internet effectively makes cyberspace an environment conducive for 
anonymous cyber conduct designed to avoid detection. It has been observed that “the internet is 
one big masquerade ball. You can hide behind aliases, you can hide behind proxy servers, and 
you can surreptitiously enslave other computers to do your dirty work.”508 This poignantly 
highlights the difficulty with which the current enforcement machinery of international law will 
have to contend with, and it is submitted that the present capacity for enforcement is insufficient.    
Thirdly, the primary judicial enforcement machinery of international law is currently the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, which is limited in expertise on the technical issues surrounding cyber 
operations.509 One of the key cyber challenges that will likely impede the efficacy of the current 
enforcement mechanism of international law is the issue of jurisdiction,510 a challenge 
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recognized by United States Department of Defence: “[t]he long distance and anonymous nature 
of computer network attacks may make detection and prosecution unlikely”.511  
Finally, the fact that there is an increasing number of non-State entities that have acquired 
significant cyber warfare capabilities coupled with their well known non-compliance with 
international restrictions makes it all the more difficult to enforce any conventional 
prohibitions.512 Indeed, States will invariably reject any treaty provision that constrains their 
cyber action against non-State actors who disregard prohibitions imposed by that treaty.513       
6. The Case for Alternative Avenues for Norm Evolution 
The conclusion of a treaty regulating State cyber conduct may provide definitive guidance on the 
expectations of nations facing the threat of, or contemplating launching, cyber operations. 
However, the international law-making process has its own barriers that may prevent timely and 
meaningful codification of cyber-specific norms.514 Presently, it is reasonable to state that the 
codification of new norms to govern cyber operations in the form of an international convention 
is neither viable nor desirable.515  
The better approach would be for the international legal community to continue the journey 
that was began by the drafting of the Tallinn Manual, and to embark on a more consultative and 
representative exercise (say under the auspices of the United Nations) with a view to collating 
views of a broader constituency of States and non-State actors. The next step should be to distil 
the general rules and principles of international law and to apply them in the specific context of 
cyber operations, with all the necessary modifications. These rules and principles can then be 
expressed in the form of a non-binding instrument adopted by one of the organs of the United 
Nations. 
Having been adopted by a wide constituency and with the additional legitimacy of an 
instrument adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, the norms set forth in the non-
binding instrument will likely gain extensive acceptance. The cyber-specific norms can then be 
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expanded and clarified via the process of State practice, whether by means of national 
legislation, general codes of conduct, or articulation in military manuals and operational rules of 
engagement.516 This process of the evolution of cyber-specific norms will have the unique 
advantage of a bottom-up approach to the emanation of customary norms and general principles 
of law that are derived from actual practice.517 
It is nonetheless important to acknowledge the positive effect of treaty norms in the effective 
regulation of warfare capabilities. Unlike the formation of cyber-specific norms through the 
formation of a customary rule or via the emanation of a general principle of law, the articulation 
of treaty norms will be much clearer, more systematic, and arguably more efficient. However, it 
is useful to recall that the unique nature of cyber weapons and cyberspace; in contrast to kinetic 
weapons that are deployed in the physical domain (land, air, sea, and space), the potential 
consequences of cyber operations in networked environments is not yet fully known. This makes 
it difficult to develop precise rules by means of a treaty.518  
Therefore, it will be far more prudent to set in motion a process that will see cyber-specific 
norms develop over time and be clarified through practice.519 It can thus be concluded that 
instead of relying on a treaty to found new norms to govern the conduct of cyber operations, 
cyber-specific norms should evolve primarily through consistent and representative practice. At 
present, however, it would be premature to attempt to articulate norms to conclusively govern 
activity in cyberspace which will invariably continue to evolve.520 
7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
This Chapter has discussed two different approaches to the development of international legal 
norms: treaty and practice. It has shown that the latter approach has been comparatively more 
successful than the former, in large part, because it is free from political and other institutional 
hurdles. After discussing the merits and demerits of both approaches, it has demonstrated that the 
challenges that will likely encumber a proposed treaty on cyber operations will render it 
ineffective.  
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The approach that I have argued for been endorsed in this Chapter is to let cyber-specific 
norms develop, gain wide acceptance, and be clarified through the process of practice. This 
argument has been put forth on the basis that the emergence of cyber-specific norms through the 
channels of custom, the emanation of general principles of law, or edicts of military law and 
conduct would have a better prospect of advancing the legal regulation of cyber warfare than via 
treaty law. This is primarily because the process will not only secure the credibility and 
legitimacy of the final product, but it would also be free of the challenges that are likely to 
prevent the drafting of a meaningful treaty. Moreover, because neither the potential of 
cyberspace operations nor the pace of technological development can be predicted, it is far more 
appropriate to progressively develop cyber-specific norms on a case-by-case basis in the context 
of practice.         
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
The utility of cyber space as a platform for waging warfare presents numerous challenges to 
current international law. Indeed, the increasing use of cyber operations brings with it some 
unique difficulties because the existing rules do not provide specific rulings on the application of 
the current law to the emergent aspects of these new forms of warfare. This situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the legal regulation of certain aspects of the use of force and armed 
conflict are not well settled, even in the context of kinetic operations. Hence, the resulting 
ambiguity makes it difficult for parties to a cyber incident to determine with certainty what the 
specific rules are that should guide their conduct. 
Recognizing that technological changes in general and the hostile use of cyber operations in 
particular pose a significant challenge to the current international law, the Tallinn Manual was 
drafted to provide some clarity in this regard. In particular, the Manual sought to elaborate how 
current international law applies to cyber operations in terms of the jus ad bellum (the law on the 
use of force) and the jus in bello (the law of armed conflict). This dissertation has examined 
selected aspects of the Manual and consequently suggested how the overall legal regulation of 
cyber operations can be improved.        
2. Concluding Observations 
This research has focused on the Rules of the Tallinn Manual with a view to reviewing its 
content and to suggest how cyber-specific norms can develop. Its analysis of certain Rules of the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello has shown some progressive aspects of the Manual, but has 
also revealed that the Manual only partially addresses, or does not at all, address some critical 
legal issues. This is problematic because the fundamental issues which the Manual was supposed 
to clarify have only been discussed superficially. For instance, the Manual and particularly the 
commentary fails to discuss in sufficient detail the legal issues surrounding attribution and the 
relevant evidentiary standard. This illustrates how difficult it will be for States to draw any 
practical guidance regarding this legal issue.  
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In light of the normative deficiencies of the Tallinn Manual, this research explored a 
comparative approach whereby the future of legal regulation of cyberspace operations was 
mapped on the experience of other non-binding instruments of international law. It was shown 
that the Manual follows the trends set by earlier instruments, and like its predecessors, it can 
supply the basis for the emergence of binding norms. The discussion in this research compared 
two different approaches to the development of international legal norms, namely codification 
under the auspices of the United Nations and the evolution of norms through State practice. This 
entailed a comparison of the relative successes of the Naval Warfare Manual and the Turku 
Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards in terms of developing binding legal norms 
that are extensively accepted.  
The historical development and subsequent practice of the above instruments reveals that 
there is a far better success rate when norms evolve through State practice than when they are 
codified in the form of international treaties. In particular, the adoption of the norms set forth in 
the Naval Warfare Manual has by far been more successful than the case with the Turku 
Declaration, in large part, because its norm-development process was free from political and 
other institutional hurdles. On the basis of its critical analysis of the merits and demerits of a 
proposed international convention to govern cyber operations, this research concludes that these 
daunting challenges will likely encumber such a project rendering it ineffective. It would thus be 
undesirable to try and codify international rules for cyberspace, at least for the present time.  
The better approach, which has been endorsed in this research, is to encourage cyber-specific 
norms to develop, gain wide acceptance, and be clarified through the process of practice. It has 
been systematically argued in this research that the emergence of cyber-specific norms through 
the means of custom, the emanation of general principles of law, or edicts of military law and 
conduct would have a much better prospect of advancing the international legal regulation of 
cyber warfare than through treaty law.  
This is mainly because the process will not only secure the credibility and legitimacy of the 
final product, but it would also be free of the numerous and unresolved challenges that are likely 
to prevent the drafting of a meaningful convention. Moreover, because neither the (beneficial or 
harmful) potential of cyberspace operations nor the pace of technological development can be 
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predicted, it is far more appropriate to progressively develop cyber-specific norms on a case-by-
case basis in the context of practice. 
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